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SELF-REFERENCE UPFRONT: A STUDY OF
SELF-REFERENTIAL GÖDEL NUMBERINGS
BALTHASAR GRABMAYR AND ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. In this paper we examine various requirements on the formalisa-
tion choices under which self-reference can be adequately formalised in arith-
metic. In particular, we study self-referential numberings, which immediately
provide a strong notion of self-reference even for expressively weak languages.
The results of this paper suggest that the question whether truly self-referential
reasoning can be formalised in arithmetic is more sensitive to the underlying
coding apparatus than usually believed. As a case study, we show how this
sensitivity affects the formal study of certain principles of self-referential truth.
1. Introduction
Notions of self-reference feature prominently in the philosophical literature, yet
they are notoriously elusive and mostly left imprecise. The study of certain log-
ical and philosophical issues, however, such as semantic paradoxes and the se-
mantics of both natural and formal languages, requires a precise understanding of
self-reference. For instance, an adequate evaluation of the contentious hypothesis
that circularity lies at the root of all semantic paradoxes requires a satisfactory
and precise explication of self-reference (see (Leitgeb, 2002)). Following the wide-
spread custom of arithmetisation, the explication and investigation of self-reference
is therefore typically carried out in a formal arithmetical framework.
There are essentially two ways an arithmetical sentence can be taken to (directly)
refer to itself, namely, in virtue of containing a term denoting (the code of) itself, or
by means of quantification (see (Leitgeb, 2002), (Picollo, 2018)). In this paper we
are only concerned with the first kind of self-reference, also called “self-reference by
mention” or in short “m-self-reference” (Picollo, 2018, p. 581). Halbach and Visser
(2014a) trace this notion of self-reference back to the famous exchange of Kreisel
and Henkin regarding Henkin’s question as to whether sentences that state their
own PA-provability are provable in PA. Heck (2007), for instance, considers m-
self-reference the only legitimate way to formalise truly self-referential reasoning in
arithmetic. A precise notion of m-self-referentiality in an arithmetical framework
rests on three formalisation choices:
i. a formal language
ii. a Gödel numbering
iii. a naming device
Given the central importance of m-self-reference in the literature, the primary
concern of this paper is to examine the formalisation choices under which m-self-
reference is attainable. That is, we ask for which choices of (i)-(iii) we can find for
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each formula A(x), with free variable x, a closed term t which denotes the Gödel
code of A(t).
Let L0 be the arithmetical language which has 0, S, + and × as its non-logical
vocabulary. Let ξ be a standard numbering of L0 and consider the canonical naming
device which maps each number n to its standard numeral n. Taken together, these
canonical formalisation choices do not, generally, permit the construction of m-self-
referential sentences.1 There are two well-known routes to overcome this.
The first route consists in enriching the arithmetical language by function sym-
bols for primitive recursive functions, such that the resulting language L+ contains
a term δ(x) which represents a diagonal function D. Given a standard numbering
ξ+ of L+, a diagonal function D, adequate for these choices, maps (the ξ+-code of)
an L+-formula A(x) with x free to (the ξ+-code of) its diagonalisationA(δ(ξ+(A))).
This language extension can be achieved in different ways. Since D is primitive re-
cursive, one may simply add a function symbol for D to L0, or one can add function
symbols for other p.r. functions such as the substitution function and the numeral
function and then represent D as a complex term, etc. Let RL+ be the result of
adding all true equations of the form t = n to the Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson the-
ory R, where t is a closed L+-term. The Strong Diagonal Lemma then provides the
existence of m-self-referential sentences:
Lemma 1.1 (Strong Diagonal Lemma for L+). For every L+-formula A(x) with
x as a free variable, there exists a closed L+-term t such that RL+ ⊢ t = ξ(A(t)).
The second route is based on so-called self-referential Gödel numberings. A
numbering ξ is called self-referential if, for any formula A(x), we can find a num-
ber n such that n = ξ(A(n)). Self-referential numberings thus immediately pro-
vide m-self-referential sentences, without the need of extending the language (and
the theory). Self-referential Gödel numberings were constructed in (Visser, 1989)
(also: (Visser, 2004)), in (Heck, 2007) and in the Appendix of (Halbach and Visser,
2014b). The last construction is for efficient numerals: see below.
The second route is typically taken to be contrived and unsatisfactory since the
self-referential numberings existing in the literature to date do not satisfy certain
desirable properties. One such property is monotonicity, which requires the Gödel
number of an expression to be larger than the Gödel numbers of its sub-expressions.
Halbach (2018), for instance, does not consider non-monotonic Gödel numberings as
adequate formalisation choices.2 Indeed, in the study of self-reference, monotonicity
is prevalently required to hold for any reasonable or adequate numbering. It is, thus,
widely believed that for adequate choices of Gödel numberings m-self-reference is
not attainable in arithmetic formulated in L0 (see (Heck, 2007)). Accordingly, the
natural setting to formalise self-referential reasoning is typically based on the first
approach, by increasing the expressiveness of the language L0.
The aim of the present paper is to further investigate this trade-off between the
(term-)expressiveness of the language and the naturalness of the underlying coding.
In particular, we will show that the received view regarding the unattainability of
m-self-reference in L0 is committed to much stronger assumptions on the coding
apparatus than usually assumed in the literature.
1See Lemma 8.3 for a generalisation of this fact.
2We do think more argument is needed to philosophically justify constraints on Gödel num-
berings. However, our present interest is not in that discussion, but in the further implications of
such constraints.
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We will start by investigating which requirements on Gödel numberings are suffi-
cient to rule out self-referential numberings as admissible formalisation choices. We
will first observe that when employing standard numerals, self-referential Gödel
numberings indeed cannot be monotonic (see Section 3.2). Thus, by Halbach’s
standards, self-referential Gödel numberings would be disqualified as adequate for-
malisation choices. They could be, at most, a technical tool providing an alternative
proof of the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma and, thus, of the Incompleteness Theorems.
(See also the discussion in (Grabmayr, ming).)
This is not the end of the story, however. While the attainability of m-self-
referential sentences is not affected by the underlying naming device (as will become
clear from inspection of Definition 3.2), we will show that the (in-)compatibility of
monotonicity and self-referentiality of numberings depends crucially on this aspect
of formalisation. In fact, we will show in this paper that we can produce effective
self-referential monotonic numberings by basing the definition of self-referential on
efficient instead of standard numerals (see Section 4 & Appendix A). That is, for any
formula A(x), we can find a number n such that n = ξ(A(n)), where n denotes the
efficient numeral of n (see Section 2.4). Setting t := n hence yields R ⊢ t = ξ(A(t)).
The adequacy constraints on numberings have thus to be strictly more restrictive
than effectiveness and monotonicity in order to rule out self-referential numberings
and, in particular, m-self-referentiality in L0.
In Section 6, we introduce a strengthened notion of monotonicity put forward
by Halbach (2018), which captures the idea that (efficient) numerals are arithmeti-
cal proxies for quotations. A monotonic coding is called strongly monotonic if
the code of the Gödel numeral of an expression is larger than the code of the ex-
pression itself. This constraint on numberings is sufficiently restrictive to exclude
self-referential numberings for any numeral system. However, we will show that
even strong monotonicity is not restrictive enough to exclude m-self-referentiality.
In fact, we will construct an effective and strongly monotonic numbering which
gives rise to the Strong Diagonal Lemma for L0, thus providing m-self-referential
sentences formulated in L0.
In Section 7, we introduce computational constraints which are more restrictive
than effectiveness and which may serve as additional adequacy constraints for num-
berings. A Gödel numbering is called E-adequate if it represents a large portion
of syntactic relations and operations by elementary relations and operations on
ω. We show that the numberings constructed in this paper are E-adequate in this
sense. Hence, strong monotonicity and E-adequacy taken together, are once again
not restrictive enough to exclude m-self-referentiality in L0.
In Section 8, we briefly discuss the constraint of regularity on numberings for
languages L ⊇ L0 due to Heck (2007). Indeed, this constraint is sufficiently re-
strictive to rule out the existence of m-self-referential sentences formulated in L.
However, we construct a decent numbering which is not regular for L0. Regu-
larity thus hardly serves as a necessary constraint for admissible numberings and
m-self-referentiality in L0 is in the clear.
The obtained results suggest the following disjunctive conclusion: when formalis-
ing m-self-reference in arithmetic, the adequacy constraints on reasonable number-
ings are more restrictive than widely assumed, or m-self-reference can be adequately
formalised in a less expressive language than usually believed.3 More specifically,
3In this paper, we do not take a stand on which of the disjuncts obtains.
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we conclude that either the constraints on reasonable numberings are more restric-
tive than E-adequacy and strong monotonicity taken together, or m-self-reference
is already attainable in L0.
We close, in Section 9, by showing how these results bear on the study of ax-
iomatic truth theories. In particular, we show that the constraints of E-adequacy
and (strong) monotonicity taken together are not sufficient to determine the consis-
tency of certain type-free truth theories. Thus, the formalisation of certain informal
principles of truth in an arithmetical setting is highly sensitive to the underlying
formalisation choices. These results raise doubts as to what extent such axiomatic
theories can be taken to faithfully reflect informal reasoning regarding the under-
lying principles of truth.
Finally, we hope to provide entertaining examples of Gödel numberings which
bring to light some surprising subtleties regarding the interaction between self-
reference and the employed formalisation devices.
2. Technical Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the necessary basic notions concerning syntax, the-
ories and numberings.
2.1. Languages. Languages can be represented in many ways: as free algebras,
as sets of strings, as labeled directed acyclic graphs, as . . . These choices are both
philosophically and technically important. In our context of the study of Gödel
numberings, the choice of a format for the language will often suggest a particular
choice of numerical representation. E.g., labeled directed acyclic graphs can be
modeled in the hereditarily finite sets and we can map these sets into numbers
using the Ackermann coding. It would be very natural to base a Gödel numbering
on this idea. In this paper, we will mainly employ the algebraic perspective and on
the string perspective. This does not reflect a philosophical standpoint, but is just
a limitation dictated by length. In Section 8.2.2, we will briefly consider the idea
of sharing material in syntax.
Let L0 be the language of first-order arithmetic, which contains ⊥, ⊤, =, ¬, ∧,
∨, →, ∀ and ∃ as logical constants, as well as the non-logical symbols 0, S, + and
×. The infix expressions of L0 are given as follows.
• x ::= v | x′
• t ::= x | 0 | St | (t+ t) | (t× t)
• A ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | t = t | ¬A | (A ∧A) | (A ∨ A) | (A→ A) | ∀xA | ∃xA
Alternatively, we will sometimes consider L0 to be given in Polish notation:
• x ::= v | x′
• t ::= x | 0 | St | Att | Mtt
• A ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | =tt | ¬A | ∧AA | ∨AA | →AA | ∀xA | ∃xA
Let N be the standard interpretation of L0, with ω as its domain. In this paper,
we consider arbitrary languages L ⊇ L0 with finite signature such that each con-
stant symbol c and function symbol f of L has an intended interpretation cN and
fN in N. Thus, in particular, the evaluation function ev is well-defined on closed
terms of L. For any such language L, both definitions above extend in the obvious
way. When we do not specify the employed notation system, we assume L to be
given in infix notation.
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2.2. Theories. We will mainly consider theories in the language of arithmetic. Our
basic theory is be the Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson theory R (see (Tarski et al., 1953,
p. 53)). We will extend R in a standard way to RL by adding all true equations
of the form t = n to R, where t is a closed L-term. Of course, this requires the
intended interpretations of the new function symbols in the background.
2.3. Gödel Numberings. Let S be a set. We say that a function ξ : S → ω is a
Gödel numbering or coding of S, if ξ is injective and effective. We also call ξ(A) the
(ξ-)code of A. In this paper we consider numberings of languages L given in infix
or Polish notation. We note that choice of infix language versus Polish language is,
in a sense, immaterial, since the two languages / representations of the language
are connected by a standard bijection.
Remark 2.1. We could allow one extra degree of freedom for Gödel numberings:
we could drop functionality.
For example, suppose we want to an existing coding of syntax in the finite sets
to define our Gödel numbering via coding the finite sets as numbers. There are
various ways to code the finite sets. Suppose we do it by interpreting sequences
first and then ignoring the order of the components. This gives us a non-functional
Gödel numbering. Note that it would still be injective.
For the purposes of the present paper we will not need the extra flexibility of
non-functionality. ❍
We sometimes also consider a language as embedded in a set of strings. Then,
a numbering of the strings over the given finite alphabet will induce a numbering
of the language. For instance, the infix expressions of L0 can be conceived of as
strings over an alphabet containing 17 symbols, while its Polish notations can be
formulated as strings over an alphabet with 15 symbols. (So, when we consider the
language as embedded in strings the difference between infix and Polish suddenly
does have some role.)
Remark 2.2. The Gödel numbering employed in (Feferman, 1960) is a nice ex-
ample of a Gödel numbering that looks directly at the language-as-algebra without
considering it as embedded in strings. For Feferman’s coding, the choice between
infix and Polish is irrelevant. ❍
An important example of a numbering of strings is the length-first ordering. Let
A∗ be a finite alphabet and suppose some ordering of A is given. We order the
strings of A using the length-first ordering (αn)n∈ω in which we enumerate the
strings according to increasing length, where the strings of same length are ordered
alphabetically. We set g(α) = n if α = αn.
4 We write |α| for the length of α.
Throughout this paper, we will use the following basic fact about the length-first
ordering.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose the alphabet A has N ≥ 2 letters. We then have:
N |α| − 1
N − 1
≤ g(α) <
N |α|+1 − 1
N − 1
.
It follows that |α| ≤ g(α). Moreover, whenever |α| < |β|, then g(α) < g(β).
4We note that g has the alphabet and the ordering on the alphabet as hidden parameters. To
make our notation not too heavy we will always suppress these data.
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Proof. Clearly, for any string α of A we have
|α|×︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1 ≤ g(α) ≤
|α|+1 ×︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1 ,
where, for any m,
m×︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1 is considered as an N -adic notation. The claim follows
immediately from a well-known property of geometric series:
m×︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 · · · 1 =
m−1∑
i=0
N i =
Nm − 1
N − 1 ❑
2.4. Naming Devices. Let ClTermL denote the set of closed L-terms. We call a
function ν : ω → ClTermL a numeral function for L, if ν is injective and effective
and the closed term ν(n) has value n, for each n ∈ ω. We call ν(n) the ν-numeral
of n. Standard numerals form a canonical choice of a numeral function and are
defined as follows.
• α ::= 0 | Sα.
We write n for the ordinary, or standard, numeral with value n, and also write ·
for the standard numeral function. These numerals provide unique normal forms
for the natural numbers. These normal forms reflect the fact that we naturally
read the axioms for addition and multiplication as directed. We have (x+ 0) x,
(x+ Sy) S(x+ y), (x× 0) = 0, (x× Sy) ((x× y) + x). The numerals are the
normal forms for the closed terms in this reduction system.
In the literature on weak systems, however, another kind of numeral is used
that corresponds to binary or dyadic notations. The main reason for this is simply
that the arithmetisation of the numeral function for standard numerals and the
usual Gödel numberings exhibits exponential growth. This holds for example for
the Gödel numbering g based on the length-first ordering. The numeral function
for the numerals in the other style is more efficient. Thus, these alternative nu-
merals are also called efficient numerals. We define efficient numerals for dyadic
representations as follows.
• α ::= 0 | S(SS0× α) | SS(SS0× α).
We write n for the efficient numeral with value n and write · for the efficient
numeral function. We note that efficient numerals also correspond more naturally
to reduction systems in a different signature, e.g. a theory of strings formulated
with two successors.
Remark 2.4. Consider the Gödel numbering g for the language L0 based on the
length-first ordering, where we assume we used infix notations. We note that the
cardinality of the alphabet is 17. Consider any number n.
Clearly, we have |n| = n + 1. So, 17
n+1−1
16 ≤ g(n). So g(n) has an exponential
lower bound in n.
We give an upper bound for g(n). Let the length of the dyadic notation of n be
k. We have: 2k − 1 ≤ n < 2k+1 − 1. We can estimate the length of the dyadic
numeral n by considering the worst case where the dyadic notation of n is a string
of 2’s. We find that |n| ≤ 8k + 1. Thus, using that 17 < 25, we see that:
g(n) <
178k+2 − 1
16
≤ 64 · 240k ≤ 64 · (n+ 1)40.
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So, we see that g(n) has a polynomial upper bound in n. ❍
3. Formalisations of m-Self-Reference
The notion of self-reference considered here is defined by means of a reference
relation on sentences. According to Leitgeb (2002), “a singular sentence might [...]
be defined to refer to all the referents of all of its singular terms, and only to them”
(p. 4). A sentence is then said to be self-referential if and only if it refers to itself.
By employing a Gödel numbering, this notion of self-reference can be formalised in
an arithmetical framework according to the following definition.5
Definition 3.1. A sentence of the form A(t) is calledm-self-referential with respect
to the formula A(x), if the closed term t denotes (the code of) A(t). ❍
This notion of self-reference is for example captured by the Kreisel-Henkin Cri-
terion for self-reference (see (Halbach and Visser, 2014a, p. 684)). According to
this criterion, given a formula A(x) expressing a property P , a sentence A(t) says
of itself that it has property P iff A(t) is m-self-referential with respect to A(x) (in
the sense of the above definition).
In order to make this notion of m-self-reference mathematically precise, Def-
inition 3.1 has to be specified with respect to the formalisation choices (i)-(iii).
Accordingly, we call a triple 〈L, ξ, ν〉 a formalisation choice, if
• L is a language as specified in Section 2.1;
• ξ is a Gödel numbering of L;
• ν is a numeral function for L.
Definition 3.2. We say that m-self-reference is attainable for a formalisation
choice 〈L, ξ, ν〉, if for each L-formula A(x) there exists a closed L-term t such
that RL ⊢ t = ν(ξ(A(t))).
6
❍
It is easy to see that the attainability of m-self-reference is invariant regarding the
choice of the numeral function. That is, m-self-reference is attainable for 〈L, ξ, ν1〉
iff m-self-reference is attainable for 〈L, ξ, ν2〉, for any language L, numbering ξ and
numeral functions ν1 and ν2 for L. Hence, instead of requiring the provability of
t = ν(ξ(A(t))) in Definition 3.2, one may equivalently require that RL ⊢ t = ξ(A(t)).
The reason for considering arbitrary numeral functions as parameters in formalisa-
tion choices is that certain adequacy conditions on numberings will be shown to be
sensitive to this aspect of formalisation.
Moreover, instead of using provability in RL, one can equivalently require in
Definition 3.2 that N |= t = ξ(A(t)), since RL proves every true equation of closed
L-terms.
5Picollo distinguishes the formal notions of m-reference simpliciter (2018) and alethic m-
reference (2020a). While the former is intended to capture a pre-theoretical notion of reference
simpliciter as indicated by the above quotation by Leitgeb, the latter is more restrictive and
specifically tailored to studying the reference patterns which underlie paradoxical expressions in
the context of truth. Even though Definitions 3.1 & 3.2 capture m-self-reference simpliciter, the
results of this paper also apply to alethic m-self-reference.
6We intend, of course, the call-by-value reading here: ν(ξ(A(t))) yields some term u, such that
RL ⊢ t = u.
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3.1. Adequacy of Formalisation. In formal studies of truth, self-reference and
the semantic paradoxes, it is common practice to employ natural numbers as the-
oretical proxies for syntactic expressions. Accordingly, certain designated arith-
metical domains or theories serve as domains of expressions or syntax theories
respectively. This practice of arithmetisation rests on Gödel numberings, which
can be seen as translation devices between expressions and numbers. However, as
a consequence of intensionality phenomena in metamathematics, not every num-
bering, i.e., injective and effective function, can be considered an equally adequate
candidate.
When formalising notions such as truth or (self-)reference over an arithmetical
domain or theory, it is therefore essential that the underlying Gödel numbering
constitutes an adequate translation device between expressions and numbers. Only
then are we justified in considering the given arithmetical framework a domain or
theory of expressions and in taking the formalised notions to apply to linguistic
expressions as intended. In order to guarantee a faithful formalisation of the given
philosophical notions, adequate choices of formalisation are thus required.
It is notoriously difficult to precisely characterise the notion of adequacy for num-
berings for a given metamathematical or philosophical purpose. We will therefore
adopt a more modest approach in this paper by discussing certain necessary condi-
tions for adequate numberings which can be found in the literature on self-reference
and axiomatic truth theories.
3.1.1. Monotonicity. Perhaps, the most prominent adequacy constraint is mono-
tonicity. Let S be a set and let ⊳ be a strict partial order relation on S. A
Gödel numbering ξ of S is called monotonic with respect to ⊳, if α ⊳ β implies
ξ(α) < ξ(β), for all α, β ∈ S. Let L be a language given in infix or Polish notion
(see Section 2.1). We call a numbering ξ of L monotonic, if it is monotonic with
respect to the strict sub-expression relation ≺ given on infix or Polish notations re-
spectively. Monotonicity in this context can therefore be equivalently characterised
by requiring a numbering ξ of L to satisfy the following three conditions:
M1. for all L-terms s, t, if s ≺ t then ξ(s) < ξ(t);
M2. for all L-formulæ A,B, if A ≺ B then ξ(A) < ξ(B);
M3. for all L-terms s and formulæ A, if s ≺ A then ξ(s) < ξ(A).
Thus, when we consider numberings of well-formed expressions, we do not de-
mand monotonicity with respect to sub-strings. E.g., in case ξ((A ∧ B)) would be
〈7, 〈ξ(A), ξ(B)〉〉, where 〈·, ·〉 is the Cantor Pairing, the brackets do not appear in
the code, so we do not need a Gödel number for a bracket. However, when con-
sidering numberings of strings, monotonicity may be also required with respect to
the (strict) sub-string relation. Clearly, any numbering which is monotonic in this
sense also satisfies the conditions M1 - M3.
Halbach (2018) for instance does not consider non-monotonic Gödel numerings as
adequate formalisation choices. Indeed, the study of self-reference is typically based
on numberings which are required to be monotonic. This requirement is explicit
for instance in (Milne, 2007, footnote 4), (Halbach, 2014, p. 33), (Picollo, 2018, p.
573f.), (Picollo, 2020a, footnote 4) and (Picollo, 2020b, footnote 3) (where Milne
requires monotonicity with respect to the sub-string relation). A good example of
an application of (a strengthened version of) monotonicity is the proof of the falsity
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of the Σ01-truth teller for fixed-point operators with certain good properties. See
(Halbach and Visser, 2014b, Theorem 7.7).
One way to motivate this constraint as a necessary condition of adequacy for
numberings proceeds as follows. Let ≤ be the usual less-than (or equal) relation
on numbers and let  denote the sub-expression relation on the given domain L of
expressions. One may conceive of  as a parthood relation on L. One may endow
≤ with such a mereological interpretation by representing numbers as strings of
strokes. Another approach is to represent numbers as Von Neumann ordinals, and
to understand the parthood relation on sets as the containment relation ⊆ (see
e.g. (Lewis, 1991)). Then ≤ is indeed a parthood relation on numbers.7 Taking
parthood as an important structural feature of the domain of expressions, adequate
numberings may then be required to preserve structure in virtue of representing the
parthood relation  on L by a relation on ω contained in the parthood relation
≤ on numbers, which is tantamount to requiring monotonicity. We will introduce
further adequacy conditions for numberings in later sections of this paper.
3.1.2. Numerals. Thus far, we have only discussed adequacy with respect to Gödel
numberings. It remains to be clarified which numeral functions constitute adequate
formalisation choices. One approach is to characterise a numeral function as ade-
quate iff it corresponds to an acceptable or canonical naming system for the natural
numbers (see (Shapiro, 1982), (Horsten, 2005)). Note that on this approach, stan-
dard numerals as well as efficient numerals qualify as adequate numeral systems.
One way to view the natural numbers is as the free algebra for a unary function
and one generator. Addition and multiplication are, then, defined by recursion,
where the possibility of such recursions is guaranteed by the fact that we have a
free algebra. From this point of view, the standard or tally numbers indeed seem
to have a preferred status: they are the standard syntactic representations of the
elements of the free algebra. However, we would like to point out that the point
of view of this specific free algebra is not the only way to think of the natural
numbers. In a sense, viewing the natural numbers as this free algebra is taking the
tally numerals to be the basic numerals. Alternatively, we could take the dyadic
representation to be primary and work with a theory with two successors. In
such a context, the dyadic numerals would be the usual syntactic representations.
Similarly, the notion of natural number as finite cardinal does not automatically
dictate zero and successor to be the preferred signature.
We will not deal with the question of the status of numerals in this paper and
simply assume that both standard numerals as well as efficient numerals are ade-
quate choices of a naming device. For a further discussion the reader is referred to
(Auerbach, 1994).
3.2. Monotonicity and Self-Referentiality. The notion of self-referential num-
berings can be generalised to arbitrary numeral functions.
Definition 3.3. A numbering ξ is called self-referential for a numeral function ν
if, for any formula A(x), there exists n ∈ ω such that n = ξ(A(ν(n))). ❍
7Note that this interpretation breaks down for other reasonable representations, such as Zer-
melo ordinals or equivalence classes of finite sets under the equivalence relation of equinumerosity.
For a critical discussion of monotonicity, see (Grabmayr, ming).
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As opposed to the notion of m-self-reference for sentences (see Definition 3.1),
self-reference for numberings is a mere technical concept and not intended to capture
a pre-theoretical or philosophical notion. However, as we have seen, self-referential
numberings immediately yield m-self-referential sentences.
In the following sections we will investigate whether adequate numberings can
be self-referential, i.e., whether self-referential numberings are indeed as contrived
as typically believed. We will first examine whether monotonicity serves as an
adequacy condition on numberings which is sufficiently restrictive to exclude self-
referential numberings and will then turn to additional more restrictive adequacy
constraints for numberings.
Let st : ClTermL → ω be the function assigning to each closed L-term the number
of its proper sub-terms. We then get the following incompatibility result.
Lemma 3.4. Let ν be a numeral function such that there is a constant c ∈ ω with
n− st(ν(n)) < c for all n ∈ ω. Then, there is no numbering which is self-referential
for ν and satisfies M2 and M3.
Proof. Assume that ξ is self-referential for ν and satisfies M2 and M3. Let B(x) be
an L-formula in which x does occur freely at least once. Set
A(x) := B(x) ∨ . . . ∨B(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c+1)×
.
Then there exists n ∈ ω such that ξ(A(ν(n))) = n. By M2 and M3 we then get
n = ξ(A(ν(n)))
= ξ(B(ν(n)) ∨ . . . ∨B(ν(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c+1)×
)
≥ ξ(B(ν(n)) ∨ . . . ∨B(ν(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
c×
) + 1 ≥ · · ·
≥ ξ(B(ν(n))) + c
≥ ξ(ν(n)) + c
≥ st(ν(n)) + c,
in contradiction to the assumption that n− st(ν(n)) < c. ❑
Since n− st(n) < 1 for all n ∈ ω, we conclude from the above lemma:
Corollary 3.5. There is no self-referential numbering for standard numerals which
is monotonic.
After the second author’s lecture on Cogwheels of Self-reference at the workshop
Ouroboros, Formal Criteria of Self-Reference in Mathematics and Philosophy on
February 17, 2018, Joel Hamkins asked whether the result on the non-monotonicity
of self-referential Gödel numberings also holds when we consider efficient numerals.
We first note that Lemma 3.4 does not apply to efficient numerals. We define:
• 0˜ := 0
• fln+ 1 := S(SS0× n˜).
Let ev be the evaluation function for arithmetical closed terms and let |α| denote
the length of the string α. We find:
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Lemma 3.6. For every n ∈ ω
• ev(n˜) = 2n − 1;
• |n˜| = 7n+ 1;
• the number of subterms-qua-type of n˜ is ≤ 2n+ 3.
From this lemma we conclude that the function λn.2n − 1 grows exponentially
while the number of sub-terms of 2n − 1 is not larger than 2n + 3 and thus only
grows linearly. Hence, the assumption of Lemma 3.4 cannot be satisfied for efficient
numerals, since there is no constant c such that n− st(n) < c for all n ∈ ω.
Indeed, in what follows we show that the answer to Hamkins’ question is no, by
constructing a monotonic numbering which is self-referential for efficient numerals.
4. A Monotonic Self-Referential Numbering
Let L be an arithmetical language, as introduced in Subsection 2.1, and let L(c)
be L extended with a fresh constant c. Let A0, A1, . . . be an effective enumeration
of all expressions of L(c). We assume that if C  An, then, for some k ≤ n, we
have C = Ak.
We define ⌈A⌉ as the number of sub-expressions-qua-type of A, in other words,
⌈A⌉ is the cardinality of {B | B  A}. The following trivial observation is very
useful:
Lemma 4.1. ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k + 1.
Here is our construction.
We construct a list Λ := (Bn)n∈ω in stages k. Let n(k) := 2
k+4 + 1. Each
stage k will result in a list Λk = B0, . . . , Bn(k)−1. To simplify the presenta-
tion, we make Λ−1 the empty list and n(−1) := 0.
In stage k, we act as follows. Let A∗k := Ak[c := S
· (k + 4)]. Let the sub-
expressions of A∗k that do not occur in Λk−1 and are not of the form m be
Ai0 , . . . , Aiℓ−1 , where the sequence ij is strictly increasing. We note that ℓ
could be 0. We define B
n(k)−ℓ+j := Aij , for j < ℓ. Let s be the smallest
number such that s is not in Λk−1. We set Bn(k−1)+p := s+ p, for p <
n(k)− n(k − 1)− ℓ.
To see that our construction is well-defined it is sufficient that n(k)− ℓ ≥ n(k − 1)
or, equivalently, ℓ ≤ n(k)− n(k − 1). We note that:
ℓ ≤ ⌈A∗k⌉ ≤ ⌈Ak⌉+ ⌈S
· (k + 4)⌉ − 1 ≤ k + 1 + 2(k + 4) + 3 = 3k + 12.
(The −1 in the right-hand-side of the second inequality can be seen as follows. In
case c occurs in Ak it is subtracted in the substitution. If c does not occur, we have
Ak = A
∗
k and, from this, the inequality follows immediately.)
If k = 0, we have 3 · 0+ 12 = 12 < 17 = 20+4+1− 0 = n(0)− n(−1). Let k > 0.
We find:
3k + 12 < 2k+3 = 2k+4 + 1− 2k+3 − 1 = n(k)− n(k − 1).
Lemma 4.2. Suppose Ak ∈ L. Then, Ak is in Λk and, hence, in Λ.
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Proof. Consider stage k. We note that A∗k = Ak. In case Ak occurs in Λk−1,
we are done. In case Ak is not in Λk−1 and not of the form m, clearly, Ak will
be added, so we are again done. Suppose Ak = m, for some m. It follows that
m + 1 = ⌈m⌉ ≤ k + 1. We note that all sub-expressions of Ak are all of the form
m′, for m′ ≤ m. So ℓ = 0. Clearly, m + 1 ≤ k + 1 < n(k) − n(k − 1). So, all
sub-expressions of Ak are either in Λk−1 or will be added. ❑
Lemma 4.3. Suppose C  Bn. Then, for some j ≤ n, we have C = Bj.
Proof. Let C  Bn. Suppose Bn is added in stage k. Then, Bn is either of the
form m or a sub-expression of A∗k not of the form m.
Suppose Bn = m. Let s be the smallest number such that s is not in Λk−1. For
all s′ < s, we have s′ ∈ Λk−1. By our construction, all s
′′, for s ≤ s′′ ≤ m are
added at stage k in ascending order. So, for all s◦ ≤ m, we find that s◦ precedes
m in Λk. Finally, each sub-expression C of m is of the form s
◦, for some s◦ ≤ m.
Suppose Bn is added as a sub-expression of A
∗
k not of the form m. First suppose
C = p. We note that p + 1 = ⌈p⌉ < ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k + 1. This tells us, by Lemma 4.2,
that p is in Λk−1. Hence, it is added to Λ before Bn. Now suppose that C is not
of the form p. Then either C is in Λk−1 or added to Λk before Bn. ❑
Lemma 4.4. The enumeration Λ is without repetitions.
Proof. Consider any C ∈ L. If C is not of the form m by our construction it will
be only added once.
Suppose C = m. We note that, by Lemma 4.3, the n such that n ∈ Λk−1 are
downwards closed. This means that, in our construction, there is no m ≥ s, such
that m ∈ Λk−1. So all the m that are added in any stage k are new. ❑
Lemma 4.5. Suppose Sn˜ occurs in Λk, then n ≤ k + 4.
Proof. We prove this by induction on k. In stage 0, we easily verify that the largest
term of the form Sn˜ can be at most S4˜.
Suppose, we have our desired estimate for k − 1, where k > 0. We prove our
estimate for k. Clearly, the Sn˜ occurring in Λk−1 do satisfy our estimate. Moreover,
all the p added in stage k do not provide new elements of the form Sn˜. So, the
only interesting case is the case where Ak is not a standard numeral. Suppose it is
not. The Sn˜ that are added are all sub-expressions of A∗k = Ak[c := S
· (k + 4)]. So,
we should focus on the largest such sub-term. Suppose Sn˜  A∗k. There are two
possibilities:
i. Sn˜  Ak. In this case, we have n < ⌈Sn˜⌉ ≤ ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k + 1 ≤ k + 4.
ii. n = k + 4, since the sub-term results from the substitution for c.
In each of the possible cases, we are done. ❑
Lemma 4.6. Consider any A such that c occurs in A. Then, for some n, Bn =
A[c := n].
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Proof. Suppose c occurs in A. Let A := Ak. The only thing we have to show
that A∗k is not in Λk−1. This is certainly true for k = 0. Suppose k > 0. We
note that S· (k + 4) occurs in A∗k. So, it is sufficient to show that S· (k + 4) does not
occur in Λk−1. By Lemma 4.5, whenever Sn˜ occurs in Λk−1, we have n ≤ k + 3.
We may conclude that B
n(k)−1 = Ak[c := S(flk + 4)]. Let n := n(k) − 1. Since
S(flk + 4) = n(k)− 1, we are done. ❑
Setting gn0(A) to be the unique n such that A = Bn, we have found a monotonic
self-referential Gödel numbering gn0, where monotonicity is defined with respect to
the sub-expression relation.
5. Strings
Let L be an arithmetical language, as introduced in Subsection 2.1, and let A
be the alphabet of L. Let c be a fresh letter. We define:
• A∗ is the set of all strings of A, including the empty string ε.
• Ac is A extended with c and A
∗
c is the set of all strings of Ac.
(In L(c) viewed as a subset of A∗c , we treat c as a constant-symbol.)
• α ⊑ β iff α is a sub-string of β.
• |α| is the length of α.
• ⌊α⌋ is the number of sub-strings-qua-type of α, in other words, ⌊α⌋ is the
cardinality of {β | β ⊑ α}.
We have the following well-known fact.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose |α| = n. Then, the number of non-empty-sub-string-occur-
rences in α is n(n+1)2 . As a consequence, ⌊α⌋ ≤
n2+n+2
2 .
Proof. Suppose |α| = n. Let us number the spaces before and after the letter-
occurrences in α: 1, . . . , n+ 1. Each non-empty-sub-string-occurrence corresponds
uniquely to the pair of the space before and the space after the occurrence. So, the
number of such occurrences is
(
n+1
2
)
= n(n+1)2 . ❑
Since we are not striving for maximal efficiency, we will estimate ⌊α⌋ by |α|2 + 1.
Let a := S(SS0 × . Then, Sn˜ = San0)n. So, |Sn˜| = 1 + 6n + 1 + n = 7n + 2 and,
thus, ⌊Sn˜⌋ ≤ (7n+ 2)2 + 1 = 49n2 + 28n+ 5.
Remark 5.2. We note that a much better estimate of ⌊Sn˜⌋ is possible but that
its growth rate will still be quadratic. In case we switch to Polish notation, this
becomes linear. Such notational choices like infix versus Polish are irrelevant in our
construction and its verification when we are considering sub-expressions. In the
sub-string format, they become active.
We provide the estimate in the Polish case. For the rest of this remark we work with Polish
notation. As in Section 2.1, we write M for multiplication.
Let b := SMSS0. We have Sn˜ = Sbn0. We note that, unlike a, the string b stands for a
meaningful entity, to wit λk ∈ ω.2k + 1. See (Visser, 2011). We count ⌊Sn˜⌋ as follows. Clearly
⌊S0˜⌋ = ⌊S0⌋ = 4. Suppose n > 0. We have:
• The empty string: 1.
• The number of non-empty sub-strings of b: 5·6
2
− 2 = 13. (We subtract 2, since S occurs
three times.)
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• All strings of the form αbiβ, where i < n − 1, α is a non-empty final string of b and β
is a non-empty initial string of b: 25(n − 1).
• All sub-strings that contain the the final occurrence of 0, except 0 itself: 5n + 1. (We
note that all these strings do not occur elsewhere, since they end with 00.)
• All sub-strings that contain the initial occurrence of S, except Sn˜ itself, S and SS: 5n−1.
(We note that the strings considered are unique since they start with SSM. Only Sn˜ is
an exception, since we already counted it in the previous case.)
So, in toto, we have: ⌊Sn˜⌋ = 1+ 13+ 25(n− 1) + 5n+ 1+ 5n− 1 = 35n− 11. A similar estimate
is also possible in the infix case, of course. However, the closing brackets will force the number to
be quadratic in n. ❍
We will use the following insights.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose α ∈ A∗c . Suppose m 6= 0 and n 6= 0. Consider a string
α ∈ A∗c and suppose α contains overlapping occurrences o of Sn˜ and p of S‹m.
Then, o = p.
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that p starts at the same place
as or at a later place than o. Since o does not end with either S, or SS, the initial
string SS( of p must lie in o. But the only sub-string of o of the form SS( is the
intial one. Hence o and p start at the same place. By balance considerations, the
matching closing brackets of the initial SS( in o and p should coincide. So, o = p
❑
Lemma 5.4. Suppose α ∈ A∗c and β ∈ A
∗, where c occurs in α and β is non-
empty. Let ⌊α⌋ = p, ⌊β⌋ = q and |β| = r. Then, ⌊α[c := β]⌋ ≤ (p− 1)r2 + q. Since
q ≤ r2 + 1, it follows that ⌊α[c := β]⌋ ≤ pr2 + 1.
Proof. Let α∗ be α[c := β] where the original string α is supposed to be black and
where we colored each sub-string occurrence of β that resulted from the substitution
with a unique color. We will consider black not to be a color here. Consider any
non-empty sub-string γ∗ of α∗. We replace all maximal sub-string occurrences of
the same color by a single occurrence of c. This corresponds to a unique sub-string
occurrence of γ in α. If γ is c, it has q − 1 originals-qua-type. If γ 6= c, the largest
number of originals-qua-type obtains when γ both begins and ends with a c. This
number of originals is ≤ r2. So, ⌊α[c := β]⌋ ≤ (p− 1)r2 + q− 1+ 1 = (p− 1)r2 + q.
❑
Let α0, α1, . . . be an effective enumeration of the strings in A
∗
c . We assume that
if γ ⊑ αn, then, for some k ≤ n, we have γ = αk. The following trivial observation
is very useful:
Lemma 5.5. ⌊αk⌋ ≤ k + 1.
Here is our construction.
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We construct a list Λ := (βn)n∈ω in stages k. Let n(k) := 2
k+15 + 1. Each
stage k will result in a list Λk = β0, . . . , βn(k)−1. To simplify the presentation,
we make Λ−1 the empty list and n(−1) := 0.
In stage k, we act as follows. Let α∗k := αk[c := S
‚ (k + 15)]. Let the sub-
strings of α∗k that do not occur in Λk−1 and are not of the form ⊥
m be
αi0 , . . . , αiℓ−1 , where the sequence ij is strictly increasing. We note that ℓ
could be 0. We define β
n(k)−ℓ+j := αij , for j < ℓ. Let s be the smallest
number such that ⊥s is not in Λk−1. We set βn(k−1)+p := ⊥
s+p, for p <
n(k)− n(k − 1)− ℓ.
To see that our construction is well-defined it is sufficient that n(k)− ℓ ≥ n(k − 1)
or, equivalently, ℓ ≤ n(k) − n(k − 1). We note that, if k = 0, we have α0 = ε,
and hence ℓ = 1. Moreover, n(0) − n(0 − 1) = 215 + 1. So, we are done. Suppose
k > 0. Clearly, n(k) − n(k − 1) = 2k+14. In case c does not occur in αk, we have
ℓ ≤ ⌊α∗k⌋ = ⌊αk⌋ ≤ k + 1 ≤ 2
k+14. In case c does occur αk, we have:
ℓ ≤ ⌊α∗k⌋ ≤ ⌊αk⌋|S
‡k + 15|2 + 1 ≤ (k + 1)(7(k + 15) + 2)2 + 1 ≤ 2k+14
We leave the verification of the last inequality to the diligent reader.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose αk ∈ A∗. Then, αk is in Λk and, hence, in Λ.
Proof. Consider stage k. We note that α∗k = αk. In case αk occurs in Λk−1, we
are done. In case αk is not in Λk−1 and not of the form ⊥
m, clearly, αk will be
added, so we are again done. Suppose αk = ⊥
m, for some m. It follows that
m + 1 = ⌊⊥m⌋ ≤ k + 1. We note that all sub-strings of αk are all of the form
⊥m
′
, for m′ ≤ m. So ℓ = 0. Clearly, m + 1 ≤ k + 1 < n(k) − n(k − 1). So, all
sub-expressions of αk are either in Λk−1 or will be added. ❑
Lemma 5.7. Suppose γ ⊑ βn. Then, for some j ≤ n, we have γ = βj.
Proof. Let γ ⊑ βn. Suppose βn is added in stage k. Then, βn is either of the form
⊥m or a sub-string of α∗k not of the form ⊥
m.
Suppose βn = ⊥
m. Let s be the smallest number such that ⊥s is not in Λk−1.
For all s′ < s, we have ⊥s
′
∈ Λk−1. By our construction, all ⊥
s′′ , for s ≤ s′′ ≤ m
are added at stage k in ascending order. So, for all s◦ ≤ m, we find that ⊥s
◦
precedes ⊥m in Λk. Finally, γ as a sub-string of ⊥
m is of the form ⊥s
◦
, for some
s◦ ≤ m.
Suppose βn is added as a sub-string of α
∗
k not of the form ⊥
m. First suppose
γ = ⊥p. We note that p+ 1 = ⌊⊥p⌋ < ⌊αk⌋ ≤ k + 1. This tells us, by Lemma 5.6,
that ⊥p is in Λk−1. Hence, it is added to Λ before βn. Now suppose that γ is not
of the form ⊥p. Then, either γ is in Λk−1 or added to Λk before βn. ❑
Lemma 5.8. The enumeration Λ is without repetitions.
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Proof. Consider any γ ∈ A∗. If γ is not of the form ⊥m by our construction it will
be only added once. Suppose γ = ⊥m. We note that, by Lemma 5.7, the n such
that ⊥n ∈ Λk−1 are downwards closed. This means that, in our construction, there
is no m ≥ s, such that ⊥m ∈ Λk−1. So all the ⊥
m that are added in any stage k
are new. ❑
Lemma 5.9. Suppose Sn˜ occurs in Λk, then n ≤ k + 15.
Proof. We prove this by induction on k. In stage 0, we easily verify that the largest
term of the form Sn˜ can be at most S1˜5.
Suppose, we have our desired estimate for k − 1, where k > 0. We prove our
estimate for k. Clearly, the Sn˜ occurring in Λk−1 do satisfy our estimate. Moreover,
all the ⊥p added in stage k do not provide new elements of the form Sn˜. So, the
only interesting case is the case where αk is not a string of ⊥’s. Suppose it is not.
The Sn˜ that are added are all sub-strings of α∗k = αk[c := S
‚ (k + 15)]. So, we should
focus on the largest such sub-string. Suppose Sn˜ ⊑ α∗k. There are two possibilities:
i. Sn˜ ⊑ αk. In this case, we have n < ⌊Sn˜⌋ ≤ ⌊αk⌋ ≤ k + 1 ≤ k + 15.
ii. n = k + 15, since the sub-string results from the substitution for c.
In each of the possible cases, we are done. ❑
Lemma 5.10. Consider any α such that c occurs in β. Then, for some n, βn =
α[c := n].
Proof. Suppose c occurs in α. Let α := αk. The only thing we have to show is that
α∗k is not in Λk−1. This is certainly true for k = 0. Suppose k > 0. We note that
S‚ (k + 15) occurs in α∗k. So, it is sufficient to show that S‚ (k + 15) does not occur
in Λk−1. By Lemma 5.9, whenever Sn˜ occurs in Λk−1, we have n ≤ k + 14. We
may conclude that β
n(k)−1 = αk[c := S(‡k + 15)]. Since S(‡k + 15) = n(k)− 1, we
are done. ❑
Setting gn1(α) to be the unique n such that α = βn, we have found a monotonic
self-referential Gödel numbering gn1. Here monotonicity is defined with respect to
the sub-string relation.
6. Gödel Numerals as Quotations
In the philosophical literature, Gödel numerals are typically conceived of as
canonical names for their coded expressions. One of the most canonical naming
devices is quotation, assigning to each expression A its name “A”. Accordingly, the
Tarski biconditional T(ξ(A)) ↔ A for instance is often taken as an arithmetical
proxy for the sentence “ ‘A’ is true iff A”.
The standard numeral ξ(A) is prima facie not the only candidate for an arith-
metical proxy for quotation. As there are different adequate ways to quote an
expression A, such as “A”, ‘A’, «A», etc., different numerals may be reasonably
taken as adequate arithmetical proxies of A’s quotation, such as ξ(A), ξ(A), etc.8
8While we agree that both standard and efficient Gödel numerals are canonical names for their
coded expressions, we remain sceptical as to whether they should be understood as proxies for
quotations. For instance, the word “snow” can be adequately named by its structural-descriptive
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Once ν-numerals are taken as adequate arithmetical proxies for quotations, an-
other criterion for numberings may be extracted from the basic idea underlying
monotonicity, which has been suggested by Halbach (2018). Recall that monotonic
numberings have the property that the code of an expression A is larger than the
code of any expression (strictly) contained in A. Since each quotation properly
contains its quoted expression, it may be argued, along the lines of Section 3.1,
that adequate numberings should preserve this structural feature by requiring that
the code of the Gödel ν-numeral of an expression A is larger than the code of A
itself:
M4(ν). ξ(A) < ξ(ν(ξ(A))) for all A ∈ L,
We call a numbering ξ of L strongly monotonic for ν-numerals, if ξ satisfies
M1-M3 as well as M4(ν).
We note that M4(ν) rules out that ξ(0) = 0 and ν(0) = 0, which holds for certain
length-first orderings and standard numerals. These standard numberings are not
excluded by its weakened version M4∗(ν), which is obtained by replacing < by ≤
in M4(ν). In what follows, we will always employ the version of M4(ν) which yields
the stronger result.
Since the standard numeral n has n-many proper sub-terms, any numbering
satisfying M1 also satisfies M4(·). Strong monotonicity is however not entailed by
monotonicity when efficient numerals are employed. For instance, as will follow
from the next lemma, the numbering gn0 is monotonic but not strongly monotonic
for efficient numerals. In fact, strong monotonicity is incompatible with the self-
referentiality of numberings.
Lemma 6.1. Let ν be a numeral function for L. There is no numbering of L which
is self-referential for ν and satisfies M3 & M4∗(ν).
Proof. Suppose ξ is a self-referential numbering of L. Consider any formula A(x)
with free variable x and n ∈ ω such that ξ(A(ν(n))) = n. Since ν(n) ≺ A(ν(n)),
using M3 and M4∗(ν) yields the contradiction
n = ξ(A(ν(n))) ≤ ξ(ν(ξ(A(ν(n))))) = ξ(ν(n)) < ξ(A(ν(n))) = n. ❑
Thus, if we strengthen the conception of monotonicity in the above manner,
then, by Halbach’s standards, there are no reasonable numberings which are self-
referential.
6.1. A Critical Remark. We are somewhat sceptical whether strong monotonic-
ity really is a necessary constraint for reasonable numberings (see also footnote 8).
For instance, we now show that the length-first numbering is not strongly mono-
tonic for a fairly reasonable numeral function based on prime decomposition. Any
philosophically stable view which excludes self-referential numberings as adequate
formalisation choices along the above lines, hence appears to be committed to ren-
der the introduced numeral function below an inadequate naming device.
name ess ⌢ en ⌢ oh ⌢ doubleyoo, by “ ‘wons’ ”, by “ ‘ssnnooww’”, by baptising it “(1)”, etc., all of
which do not contain the named expression. The justification of the constraint M4(ν), introduced
below, seems thus to rely on a specific feature of quotation which is not shared by several other
adequate naming devices.
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Example 6.2. Let LQ := L0 ∪{Q}, where Q is a unary function symbol for taking
the square. Let g be a numbering of LQ based on the length-first ordering.
Are there plausible numerals for which strong monotonicity fails w.r.t. g? This
is indeed the case. We give an example of such numerals that seems reasonably
natural.
We consider the following numeral function pd. (‘pd’ stands for prime decompo-
sition.)
i. pd(0) := 0 and pd(1) := S0.
ii. Suppose n > 1, and n is not a power of a prime. Let p be the smallest prime
that divides n. Say n = pi ·m, where p does not divide m and i > 0. Then,
pd(n) := ×pd(pi)pd(m).
iii. Suppose n = pi, where p is prime and i > 0. We take pd(p) := p. In case
i = 2k, for k > 0, we set pd(n) := Qpd(pk). In case i = 2k + 1, for k > 0, we
set pd(n) := ×pQpd(pk).
We find that, e.g.,
pd(22
m
) =
m×︷ ︸︸ ︷
Q . . .Q 2.
It follows that |pd(22
m
)| = m+ 3. Hence, by Lemma 2.3,
g(pd(22
m
)) ≤
16m+4 − 1
15
Since 22
m
has double exponential growth, the failure of strong monotonicity is
immediate.
We note that pd has good properties for multiplication but does not seem to be
very friendly towards successor and addition.
One can imagine many variants of pd. For example, we can replace p by p in the
definition. Alternatively, we can make p where we replace clause (iii) by:
• Suppose n = pi, where p is prime and i > 0. We take p(p) := Sp(p− 1). In
case i = 2k, for k > 0, we set p(n) := Q p(pk). In case i = 2k+1, for k > 0,
we set p(n) := ×Sp(p− 1)Q p(pk).
❍
We leave an in-depth discussion of this constraint’s adequacy for another occasion
and, from now on, simply assume that there are good reasons to consider strong
monotonicity to be a necessary constraint for reasonable numberings. In the next
section we further examine the implications of this constraint on the attainability
of self-reference.
6.2. A Strongly Monotonic Numbering with Strong Diagonalisation. While
strong monotonicity excludes self-referential numberings (Lemma 6.1), we now show
that this constraint is not sufficiently restrictive to rule out m-self-reference in L0.
In particular, we construct a strongly monotonic numbering gn2 for efficient nu-
merals which satisfies the Strong Diagonal Lemma for L ⊇ L0:
Lemma 6.3 (Strong Diagonal Lemma for L). Let C be an L-expression with x as a
free variable. Then there exists a closed term t in L such that RL ⊢ t = gn2(C[x := t]).
We note that we escape Lemma 6.1 here by allowing t to be different from the
efficient numeral of the value of t.
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Let L be an arithmetical language, as introduced in Subsection 2.1, and let L(c)
be L extended with a fresh constant c. Let A0, A1, . . . be an effective enumeration
of all expressions of L(c). We assume that if C  An, then, for some k ≤ n, we
have C = Ak.
We define ⌈A⌉ as the number of subexpressions-qua-type of A, in other words,
⌈A⌉ is the cardinality of {B | B  A}. The following trivial observation is very
useful:
Lemma 6.4. ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k + 1.
Let the function ·̂ : ω → L be given by setting 0̂ := v and’n+ 1 := n̂′. As in the case
of standard numerals, expressions of the form “m are downwards closed with regard
to the sub-expression relation and we have that ⌈“m⌉ = m + 1. In the following
construction, we use expressions of the form “m instead of standard numerals as
fillers. This ensures that the constructed enumeration does not start with 0 and
thus that the resulting numbering is strongly monotonic.
Here is our construction.
We construct a list Λ := (Bn)n∈ω in stages k. Let n(k) := 2
2k+4 + 1.
Each stage k will result in a list Λk = B0, . . . , Bn(k)−1. To simplify the
presentation, we make Λ−1 the empty list and n(−1) := 0.
In stage k, we act as follows. Let A∗k := Ak[c := S
· (k + 2)]. Let the sub-
expressions of A∗k that do not occur in Λk−1 and are not of the form “m be
Ai0 , . . . , Aiℓ−1 , where the sequence ij is strictly increasing. We note that ℓ
could be 0. We define B
n(k)−ℓ+j := Aij , for j < ℓ. Let s be the smallest
number such that ŝ is not in Λk−1. We set Bn(k−1)+p :=’s+ p, for p <
n(k)− n(k − 1)− ℓ.
To see that our construction is well-defined it is sufficient that n(k)− ℓ ≥ n(k − 1)
or, equivalently, ℓ ≤ n(k)− n(k − 1). We note that:
ℓ ≤ ⌈A∗k⌉ ≤ ⌈Ak⌉+ ⌈S
· (k + 2)⌉ − 1 ≤ k + 1 + 2(k + 2) + 3 = 3k + 8. (∗)
(The −1 in the right-hand-side of the second inequality can be seen as follows. In
case c occurs in Ak it is subtracted in the substitution. If c does not occur, we have
Ak = A
∗
k and, from this, the inequality follows immediately.)
If k = 0, we have 3 · 0+ 8 = 8 < 17 = 22(0+2)+1− 0 = n(0)− n(−1). Let k > 0.
We find:
3k + 8 < 3 · 22k+2 = 22k+4 + 1− 22k+2 − 1 = n(k)− n(k − 1).
Lemma 6.5. Suppose Ak ∈ L. Then, Ak is in Λk and, hence, in Λ.
Proof. Consider stage k. We note that A∗k = Ak. In case Ak occurs in Λk−1,
we are done. In case Ak is not in Λk−1 and not of the form “m, clearly, Ak will
be added, so we are again done. Suppose Ak = “m, for some m. It follows that
m+1 = ⌈“m⌉ ≤ k+1. We note that all sub-expressions of Ak are of the form n̂, for
n ≤ m. So ℓ = 0. Clearly, m+ 1 ≤ k + 1 < n(k)− n(k − 1). So, all sub-expressions
of Ak are either in Λk−1 or will be added. ❑
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Lemma 6.6. Suppose C  Bn. Then, for some j ≤ n, we have C = Bj.
Proof. Let C  Bn. Suppose Bn is added in stage k. Then, Bn is either of the
form “m or a sub-expression of A∗k not of the form “m.
Suppose Bn = “m. Let s be the smallest number such that ŝ is not in Λk−1. For
all u < s, we have û ∈ Λk−1. By our construction, all v̂, for s ≤ v ≤ m are added
at stage k in ascending order. So, for all w ≤ m, we find that ŵ precedes “m in Λk.
Finally, each sub-expression C of “m is of the form ŵ, for some w ≤ m.
Suppose Bn is added as a sub-expression of A
∗
k not of the form “m. First suppose
C = p̂. We note that p + 1 = ⌈p̂⌉ < ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k + 1. This tells us, by Lemma 6.5,
that p̂ is in Λk−1. Hence, it is added to Λ before Bn. Now suppose that C is not
of the form p̂. Then, either C is in Λk−1 or added to Λk before Bn. ❑
Lemma 6.7. The enumeration Λ is without repetitions.
Proof. Consider any C ∈ L. If C is not of the form “m by our construction it will
be only added once.
Suppose C = “m. We note that, by Lemma 6.6, the n such that n̂ ∈ Λk−1 are
downwards closed. This means that, in our construction, there is no m ≥ s, such
that “m ∈ Λk−1. So all the “m that are added in any stage k are new. ❑
Lemma 6.8. Suppose Sn˜ occurs in Λk, then n ≤ k + 2.
Proof. We prove this by induction on k. In stage 0, we easily verify that the largest
term of the form Sn˜ can be at most S2˜.
Suppose, we have our desired estimate for k − 1, where k > 0. We prove our
estimate for k. Clearly, the Sn˜ occurring in Λk−1 do satisfy our estimate. Moreover,
all the p̂ added in stage k do not provide new elements of the form Sn˜. So, the only
interesting case is the case where Ak is not of the form p̂. Suppose it is not. The
Sn˜ that are added are all sub-expressions of A∗k = Ak[c := S
· (k + 2)]. So, we should
focus on the largest such sub-term. Suppose Sn˜  A∗k. There are two possibilities:
i. Sn˜  Ak. In this case, we have n < ⌈Sn˜⌉ ≤ ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k + 1 ≤ k + 2.
ii. n = k + 2, since the sub-term results from the substitution for c.
In each of the possible cases, we are done. ❑
Setting gn2(A) to be the unique n such that A = Bn, we have found a monotonic
Gödel numbering gn2.
In order to show that gn2 satisfies M4(·), i.e., that gn2 is strongly monotonic for
efficient numerals, we prove the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 6.9. Suppose p  Ak[c := r], for any p, r ∈ ω. Then, p < 2k(r + 2).
Proof. Let p, r ∈ ω be given such that p  Ak[c := r]. Then (i) p  Ak or (ii) p  r
or (iii) there exists t  Ak containing c such that p = t[c := r]. In case (i), we have,
p < 2⌈p⌉ ≤ 2⌈Ak⌉ ≤ 2k+1 ≤ 2k(r + 2). In case (ii), we have p ≤ r. So both in Case
(i) and (ii), we find p < 2k(r + 2).
Suppose we are are in case (iii). Since r and t[c := r] are efficient numerals, there
exist k, j such that r and t are of the following forms:
• r = Sa0(· · · Sak(0) · · · );
• t = Sc0(· · · Scj (c) · · · );
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where ap, cq ∈ {1, 2} for each p ≤ k and q ≤ j, and S1(x) := S(SS0 × x) and
S2(x) := SS(SS0× x). Moreover, ev(r) =
∑k
i=0 aib
i. Since
t(r) = Sc0(· · · Scj (Sa0(· · · Sak(0) · · · )) · · · )
we have
p = ev(t(r))
=
j∑
i=0
ci2
i +
k∑
i=0
ai2
i+j+1
=
j∑
i=0
ci2
i + 2j+1
k∑
i=0
ai2
i
< 2j+2 + 2j+1r
= 2j+1(r + 2).
For each i ≤ j, the expression Sci(· · · Scj (c) · · · ) is a subterm of Ak. Since also c is a
subterm of Ak, we have j+2 ≤ ⌈Ak⌉ ≤ k+1. We thus conclude that p < 2
k(r+2).
❑
We now show that gn2 satisfies M4(·).
Lemma 6.10. m < gn2(m) for all m ∈ ω.
Proof. Letm be added in stage k, i.e.,m ∈ Λk\Λk−1. We then haveBn(k)−ℓ+j = m,
for some j < ℓ. (We use here the fact that no filler is of the form m). We have
ℓ ≤ 3k + 8, as noted in (∗) subsequent to presenting our construction. Hence,
22k+4 − 3k − 7 = n(k)− (3k + 8) ≤ n(k)− ℓ ≤ gn2(m).
We moreover have m  Ak[c := S· (k + 2)]. Since S· (k + 2) = 2k+2 we get
m < 2k(2k+2 + 2) = 3 · 2k+1,
by Lemma 6.9. It is easy to check that 3·2k+1 < 22k+4−3k−7. Hence, m < gn2(m).
❑
Even though gn2 cannot be self-referential for efficient numerals by Lemma 6.1,
the following modification holds.
Lemma 6.11. Consider any A such that c occurs in A. Then there exists n such
that gn2(A[c := n]) = n
2.
Proof. Suppose c occurs in A. Let A := Ak. The only thing we have to show is
that A∗k is not in Λk−1. This is certainly true for k = 0. Suppose k > 0. We note
that S· (k + 2) occurs in A∗k. So, it is sufficient to show that S· (k + 2) does not occur
in Λk−1. By Lemma 6.8, whenever Sn˜ occurs in Λk−1, we have n ≤ k+1. We may
conclude that B
n(k)−1 = Ak[c := S(flk + 2)]. Let n := 2k+2. Since n2 = n(k)− 1 and
S(flk + 2) = n, we are done. ❑
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We now can immediately derive the Strong Diagonal Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Let C(x) be given and set A := C[x := c×c]. By Lemma 6.11
there exists n ∈ ω such that gn2(A[c := n]) = n
2. Set t := n × n. We then have
A[c := n] = C[x := t]. Moreover RL ⊢ t = n
2. Hence RL ⊢ t = gn2(C[x := t]). ❑
By suitably adapting the above construction, we obtain a numbering which is
monotonic with respect to the sub-string relation, satisfies M4(·) and provides the
existence of m-self-referential sentences for L (i.e., satisfies Lemma 6.3). We leave
the details to the diligent reader.
7. Computational Constraints
In addition to requiring monotonicity, other adequacy constraints for Gödel num-
berings can be extracted from the literature. Let Po, El and Pr denote the classes
of p-time, (Kalmár) elementary and primitive recursive functions respectively. As
usual, these classes can be extended to relations and partial functions on ω as
follows.
Definition 7.1. Let C ∈ {Po,El,Pr}. We say that a subset of ωk or a relation on
ω is in C, if its characteristic function is in C.
Let R ⊆ ωk be given. We say that a function f : R → ω is in C, if the total
function f ′ : ωk → ω given by
f ′(m1, . . . ,mk) :=
®
f(m1, . . . ,mk) + 1 if m1, . . . ,mk ∈ R;
0 otherwise.
is in C. ❍
Reasonable numberings are commonly required to represent certain syntactic
relations and operations by primitive recursive relations and operations on ω (see
(Halbach, 2014, Section 5.1)). The usual definitions of the syntactic relations (i.e.,
their extensions) VarL (“is a variable”), TerL (“is a term”), AtFmlL (“is an atomic
formula”), FmlL (“is an a formula”), SentL (“is a sentence”), “is a free variable in”,
“is a PA-derivation of” etc., are either explicit or of simple recursive structure.
Adequate numberings may be required to preserve this simple algorithmic nature,
in virtue of representing these relations by primitive recursive relations on ω. More
precisely, for any adequate numbering ξ, the characteristic functions of the sets
of ξ-codes of VarL, TerL, etc. are required to be primitive recursive. A similar
constraint can be extracted for the syntactic functions =˙, ¬˙, ∧˙, ∨˙, ∀˙, ∃˙, S˙, +˙, ×˙,
Sub etc., where for instance, ∧˙ : Fml2L → FmlL maps a pair 〈A,B〉 of formulæ to
the conjunction A∧B, ∀˙ : FmlL×VarL → FmlL maps a pair 〈A, x〉 to the universal
formula ∀xA, etc., and where Sub(A, x, t) is the result of substituting the term t for
the variable x in the formula A. Once again, adequate numberings may be required
to represent these syntactic functions by primitive recursive functions on ω. Finally,
the standard and the efficient numeral function may be required to be represented
primitive recursively.
The arithmetisation of syntax in weaker theories, like Buss’ S12 and I∆0 + Ω1,
requires representation of the syntactic relations and functions in weaker theories.9
A closer inspection of what is going on shows that, in the presence of a reasonable
9See (Pudlák, 1985) for ways to deal with inefficient representations in weak theories.
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Gödel numbering like the one based on the length-first ordering, the syntactic
relations and functions can be made p-time without extra effort. See (Buss, 1986)
and (Hájek and Pudlák, 1993). The Gödel numberings we construct here fit most
naturally in the intermediate function class El.
Definition 7.2. Let C ∈ {Po,El,Pr} and let ν be a numeral function. We say
that a numbering ξ of L is C, ν-adequate, if
1. the set of ξ-codes of each syntactic relation specified above is in C;
2. the ξ-tracking function of each syntactic function specified above is in C, i.e., for
each k-ary syntactic function f , the function ξ(f) given by ξ(f)(m1, . . . ,mk) :=
ξ(f(ξ−1(m1), . . . , ξ
−1(mk))) is in C;
3. the function ξ ◦ ν is in C.
We say that ξ is C-adequate iff (C ∈ {El,Pr} and ξ is both C, (·)-adequate and
C, (·)-adequate) or (C = Po and ξ is C, (·)-adequate). ❍
The definition of C-adequate is somewhat awkward since, for a good numbering
like the one based on the length-first ordering, the function ξ◦(·) will be exponential.
This is the reason for the use of efficient numerals in the context of weak theories.
It would be interesting, and conceivably genuinely useful, to explore whether there
are Po-adequate numberings ξ for which ξ ◦ (·) is p-time.
Remark 7.3. Feferman’s Gödel numbering, say fef, in (Feferman, 1960) is a good
example to reflect on. The tracking functions are all elementary. The code for 0 is 3
and the code for successor is 7. We have fef(St) = 27 · 3fef(t). So, the numeral func-
tion for standard numerals will be superexponential and not elementary. Similarly,
for efficient numerals.
Suppose we replace Feferman’s coding for the terms by an efficient coding but
leave his code formation for formulas in place (taking appropriate measures to insure
disjointness). Then, we obtain an El-adequate Gödel numbering ̥. However, we
still would have: ̥(¬A) := 2 · 3̥(A). This means that, if we iterate negations, we
run up an exponential tower.
The example of ̥ illustrates that it is possible that a Gödel numbering is El-
adequate but not elementary in the length of expressions. This observation suggests
that, where p-time and primitive recursive satisfy a certain equilibrium, possibly
elementary does not. If the tracking function for function application is exponential,
the codes of numerals, both standard and efficient, grow too fast. So, the tracking
function for function application is severely constrained. But if this function is so
slow, it seems a certain imbalance to make other forms of application much faster.
So, why is this numbering not already Po-adequate? . . . ❍
We now introduce a useful proof-theoretical characterisation of the classes Po,
El and Pr. This will result in a specification of the theories in which C-adequate
numberings permit the arithmetisation of syntax. To this end, we first introduce
so-called provably recursive functions.
Definition 7.4. Let T be an L-theory. A function f : ωk → ω is called Σn-definable
in T , if there exists a Σn-formula A(x1, . . . , xk, y) such that
• N |= A(m1, . . . ,mk, p) iff f(m1, . . . ,mk) = p, for all m1, . . . ,mk, p ∈ ω;
• T ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xk∃!y A(x1, . . . , xk, y).
The function f is called provably recursive in T if f is Σ1-definable in T . ❍
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Remark 7.5. We note that there is some awkwardness to this definition since the
provably recursive functions of all Σ1-unsound theories extending EA, like IΣ1 +
incon(ZF), are precisely all recursive functions. This creates the mistaken impression
that, e.g., IΣ1 + incon(ZF) is stronger than PA.
With an extra argument, one can show that this malaise persists even when we
replace ‘N |= A(m1, . . . ,mk, p)’ in the definition by ‘T ⊢ A(m1, . . . ,mk, p)’.
We are unaware of attempts to address this awkwardness. ❍
The classes El and Pr can now be characterised as exactly the functions which
are provably recursive in a certain theory. The situation for the p-time computable
functions is a bit more delicate.
Theorem 7.6. Let f be a number-theoretic function. Then
• f is p-time iff f is Σb1-definable in S
1
2, where Σ
b
1 is the special formula class
introduced in (Buss, 1986);
• f is elementary iff f is provably recursive in EA;
• f is primitive recursive iff f is is provably recursive in IΣ1.
Hence, for example, for any Pr-adequate numbering ξ there exists a Σ1-formula
Conj(x, y, z) ∈ L, such that
• N |= Conj(ξ(A), ξ(B), ξ(C)) iff C = A ∧B, for all formulæ A,B,C ∈ L;
• IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x, y∃!z Conj(x, y, z);
i.e., the ξ-tracking function of ∧˙ is provably recursive in IΣ1. Indeed, the repre-
sentation of ∧˙ by a provably recursive function (in PA) is required as a necessary
condition for reasonable numberings in (Halbach, 2014, p. 33). As a result of the
above theorem, Pr-adequate numberings allow a large portion of syntax to be for-
malised in the theory IΣ1 and, similarly, for El and EA and for Po and S
1
2.
10
Recall that the constructions of the numberings gn0, gn1 and gn2 rely on an
enumeration (An)n∈ω of L-expressions. Thus far, assuming (An)n∈ω to be effective
has sufficed to ensure the effectiveness of the resulting numberings gn0, gn1 and gn2.
Since no further computational constraint has been imposed on (An)n∈ω, there is
however no reason to expect these numberings to be even Pr-adequate. In the
remainder of this paper, we will assume that the enumeration (An)n∈ω (without
repetitions) employed in the constructions of the numberings gn0, gn1 and gn2 is
obtained from a standard numbering which is El-adequate, such that (An)n∈ω also
satisfies the remaining assumptions imposed in the constructions of gn0, gn1 and
gn2 respectively. That is, (An)n∈ω = (gn
−1
∗ (n))n∈ω, for some suitable standard
numbering gn∗.
Under the assumption that (An)n∈ω is El-adequate, we now show that the num-
berings gn0, gn1 and gn2 are El-adequate, and, thus, also Pr-adequate. This will
follow from the fact that the standard numbering gn∗ is El-adequate and that gn∗,
gn0, gn1 and gn2 are elementarily intertranslatable. Let tri,j : gnj(L) → ω be the
translation function, given by tri,j := gni ◦gn
−1
j , for each i, j ∈ {∗, 0, 1, 2}. We then
have:
10We note that Halbach’s constraint loses its meaning in Σ1-unsound extensions of EA.
Also, from the technical point of view, the demand is probably too strong. For example, in
(Hájek and Pudlák, 1993), we find an arithmetisation of syntax in I∆0. Here the substitution
function is not provably total. However, we think that the Second Incompleteness Theorem can
still be formalized. Clearly, these matters require a lot more attention than has been given until
now.
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Lemma 7.7. For each i, j ∈ {∗, 0, 1, 2}, the translation functions tri,j are elemen-
tary.
Proof. We treat the case of the intertranslation of ∗ and 2. To show that tr∗,i
and tri,∗ are elementary for i = 0, 1 proceeds similarly. From these cases we can
conclude that tri,j is elementary for i, j ≤ 2.
We use the fact that the coding machinery for finite sequences can be devel-
oped in El (see, for example, (Schwichtenberg and Wainer, 2012, Chapter 2)). Let
#: ω<ω → ω be an elementary coding function of finite sequences and let lh be
the length function. Let g : ω → ω serve as a parameter. We define the function
σg : ω → ω, by setting σg(k) := #〈i0, . . . , iℓ−1〉, where Ai0 , . . . , Aiℓ−1 are exactly
the sub-expressions of Ak[c := S· (k + 2)] which are not of the form “m such that
g(n) 6= ij for all n < n(k − 1) and j < lh(σg(k)) = ℓ. Since n ∈ El and gn∗ is
El-adequate, g ∈ El implies σ ∈ El, by the usual closure properties of elementary
functions. In case that g := tr2,∗, the last clause is equivalent to Aij /∈ Λk−1 for
each j < ℓ.
Set σ := σtr2,∗ . For any n ∈ ω, we compute tr2,∗(n) by course-of-values recursion
as follows. As usual, we will take the empty sum to be 0.
Compute the smallest k (≤n) such that n ≤ 22k+4. Is p :=
22k+4 − n < lh(σ(k))?
If yes, set tr2,∗(n) := [σ(k)]lh(σ(k))−1−p.
If no, take
m := n−
k−1∑
i=0
lh(σ(i)).
Set tr2,∗(n) := gn∗(“m).
It is left to the reader to verify that this computation really defines the func-
tion tr2,∗. Note that when computing tr2,∗(n), we only resort to values of tr2,∗ for
arguments smaller than n, since n(k− 1) ≤ n. Moreover, let B : ω → ω the elemen-
tary function given by B(k) := gn∗(Ak[c := S
· (k + 2)]). Note that tr2,∗(n) codes a
filler expression of the form “m, or a sub-expression of Ak[c := S· (k + 2)]. Since in
each stage k, there are less than n(k)-many fillers added, we obtain the estimate
tr2,∗(n) ≤ max(gn∗(
¤ (k + 1) · n(k),B(k)). Hence, the employed recursion is limited.
Since elementary functions are closed under limited course-of-values recursion, we
conclude that tr2,∗ ∈ El.
In order to show that tr∗,2 is elementary, we use the fact that a function is ele-
mentary if (1) its graph is elementary and (2) it can be dominated by an elementary
function. Since tr2,∗ is elementary, it is easy to check that the graph of tr∗,2 is ele-
mentary. Hence, it is sufficient to show (2). Let Ak ∈ L. By Lemma 6.5, Ak ∈ Λk.
Hence, tr∗,2(k) < n(k) and we are done. ❑
It is easy to show that the elementary (or primitive recursive) relations and
functions are invariant regarding numberings which are elementarily (or primitive
recursively) intertranslatable.
Lemma 7.8. Let C ∈ {Po,El,Pr}. Let Si be sets and let αi, βi : Si → ω be injective
functions such that the translation functions αi ◦ β
−1
i and βi ◦ α
−1
i are in C
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i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ∈ ω. For every R ⊆ S1 × . . . × Sk, Q ⊆ Sk+1 and function
f : R→ Q we then have:
• The relation
~α(R) := {〈α1(s1), . . . , αk(sk)〉 | 〈s1, . . . , sk〉 ∈ R}
is in C iff ~β(R) is in C.
• The function f~α : ~α(R)→ ω given by
f~α(m1, . . . ,mk) := αk+1f(α
−1
1 (m1), . . . , α
−1
k (mk))
is in C iff the function f~β :
~β(R)→ ω is in C.
We have seen in this section that PR-adequacy can be extracted as a necessary
condition for reasonable numberings from the literature. Since gn∗ is E-adequate
we conclude from Lemma 7.7 and Lemma 7.8 that the numberings gn0, gn1 and
gn2 are E-adequate and, in particular, PR-adequate. Thus, the computational
constraint of PR-adequacy (or E-adequacy) is not sufficiently restrictive to deny
these numberings the status of adequate formalisation choices.
Open Question 7.9. It remains open whether there are Po-adequate versions of
the constructions given in this paper. More specifically:
• Can we find Po-adequate self-referential Gödel numberings that are mono-
tonic?
• Can we find Po-adequate Gödel numberings which satisfy the Strong Di-
agonal Lemma 6.3 that are strongly monotonic?
❍
8. Domination and Regularity
We have seen in Section 6 that strong monotonicity is not sufficient to rule out
m-self-referential sentences formulated in L. This is due to the fact that the “fixed
point” term t used in the proof of Lemma 6.3 is not an efficient numeral. Hence,
conditions M3 and M4(·) do not force the value of t to be smaller than the code of
the formula containing t.
For the remainder of this section, let L, K be fixed languages with L0 ⊆ K ⊆ L,
as specified in Section 2.1. We introduce two related constraints on numberings of
L which prohibit the code of a closed K-term to be smaller than its value. We will
see that together with requiring monotonicity, these constraints, applied to L, rule
out m-self-referential sentences formulated in L.
8.1. Domination. We start by defining the constraint of domination.
Definition 8.1. Let ξ be a numbering of L. We say that ξ is K-dominating, if it
satisfies the following principle:
M5(K). For all t ∈ ClTermK whose value is in ξ(L): ev(t) ≤ ξ(t).
We say that ξ is dominating, if it is L-dominating. ❍
Monotonic dominating numberings are strongly monotonic. More precisely,
M5(K) implies M4∗(ν) for every numeral function ν for K (cf. Section 6):
Corollary 8.2. Let ν be a numeral function for K and let ξ be a numbering of L.
If ξ satisfies M5(K), then ξ satisfies M4∗(ν).
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Proof. We have n = ev(ν(n)) ≤ ξ(ν(n)) for all n ∈ ω. Hence, ξ(A) ≤ ξ(ν(ξ(A)))
for all A ∈ L. ❑
We now show that when employing monotonic andK-dominating numberings, m-
self-reference is not attainable in K. That is, taken together, these two constraints
rule out the existence of strong fixed point terms in K.
Lemma 8.3. Let ξ be a numbering of L satisfying M3 and M5(K). Then for all
L-formulæ A(x) and closed K-terms t, N 6|= t = ξ(A(t)).
Proof. Assume that there exists an L-formula A(x) and a closed K-term t such
that N |= t = ξ(A(t)). Using M3 and M5(K), we then derive the contradiction
ev(t) = ξ(A(t)) > ξ(t) ≥ ev(t). ❑
Let ξ be a standard numbering of L+, where L+ contains a term which repre-
sents the canonical strong diagonal function. That is, L+ represents the function
which maps (the ξ-code of) an L+-formula A(x) with x free to (the ξ-code of) its
diagonalisation A(ξ(A)). As we have seen already, there exists an L+-formula A(x)
and a term t ∈ L+ such that N |= t = ξ(A[x := t]) (Lemma 1.1).
The reason to define the constraints of domination with respect to a sub-language
of the domain of a numbering can be illustrated as follows. While ξ cannot be
dominating with respect to ξ’s domain (namely, L+) by Lemma 8.3, it is possibly
dominating with respect to the sub-language L0 (for instance in case that ξ is the
length-first ordering).
However, as we will show in Section 8.2.2, there are reasonable numberings which
even fail to be L0-dominating. Moreover, there is a large class of standard num-
berings found in the literature which is not dominating with respect to languages
which contain a function symbol for exponentiation or the smash function (see Sec-
tion 8.2.3). These examples put considerable pressure on the view that domination
is a necessary condition for reasonable choices of numberings. This constraint thus
appears to be of no use to a philosophically adequate approach which aims to block
the attainability of m-self-reference in arithmetic formulated in L0.
Exactly the same remarks apply to the constraint of regularity, introduced in
the next section.
8.2. Regularity. We now introduce another constraint on numberings, along the
lines of a notion put forward in (Heck, 2007, p. 17).11
Definition 8.4. Let ξ be a numbering of L. We say that ξ is K-regular if
• ξ(c) ≥ cN for all constant symbols c ∈ K
• ξ(f(t1, . . . , tk)) > f
N(ξ(t1), . . . , ξ(tk)) for all k-ary function symbols f ∈ K
Moreover, we call ξ regular, if it is L-regular. ❍
By induction we immediately get
Lemma 8.5. Let ξ be a K-regular numbering of L. Then ξ satisfies M5(K).
Thus, K-regular numberings are K-dominating.
11Heck’s (2007) notion is an amalgam of our notion of regularity and monotonicity. In fact,
Heck’s notion of regularity is entailed by M2, M3 and M5(L0) (with ≥ replaced by >).
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8.2.1. Example of a Regular Numbering. A large class of standard numberings
found in the literature are L0-regular and hence in particular L0-dominating. As
an example, we show that the length-first numbering of L is L0-regular, where L is
given in Polish notation (see Section 2.1). This follows as a corollary from a more
general observation which has been suggested to us by Fedor Pakhomov.
Let S be a set of strings that is closed under the constructor operations A˙ and
M˙, given by 〈α, β〉 7→ Aαβ and 〈α, β〉 7→ Mαβ respectively.
Let ξ : S → ω be a numbering of S and let g : S2 → S be a binary operation
on S. We call the function which maps ξ-codes 〈m,n〉 to ξ(g(ξ−1(m), ξ−1(n))) the
ξ-tracking function of g. As usual, we call a function f : ω2 → ω monotonic, if
f(x1, x2) ≤ f(y1, y2) for all x1 ≤ y1 and x2 ≤ y2.
Lemma 8.6 (Pakhomov). Let ξ : S → ω be a bijection such that the ξ-tracking
functions of A˙ and M˙ are monotonic. We have for all α, β ∈ S:
ξ(Aαβ), ξ(Mαβ) > ξ(α) · ξ(β).
Proof. We show the claim for Mαβ. Let α, β ∈ S. Since ξ is bijective, there are
(ξ(α) + 1) · (ξ(β) + 1)-many pairs of expressions 〈α′, β′〉 such that ξ(α′) ≤ ξ(α) and
ξ(β′) ≤ ξ(β). For each such pair 〈α′, β′〉, we have ξ(Mα′β′) ≤ ξ(Mαβ), since the
tracking function of M˙ is monotonic. Moreover, for any 〈α′, β′〉 6= 〈α′′, β′′〉 we have
ξ(Mα′β′) 6= ξ(Mα′′β′′) by the injectivity of M˙ and ξ. We thus conclude
ξ(α) · ξ(β) + ξ(α) + ξ(β) = (ξ(α) + 1) · (ξ(β) + 1)− 1 ≤ ξ(Mαβ).
In particular, ξ(α) · ξ(β) < ξ(Mαβ), if one of ξ(α), ξ(β) is > 0. Moreover, if both
of ξ(α), ξ(β) are 0, then, by injectivity, Mαβ cannot be 0, so we have ξ(Mαβ) >
0 = ξ(α) · ξ(β). ❑
Let L be given in Polish notation and let A be the alphabet of L. Let g be the
length-first numbering of A∗. Note that since g is bijective and monotonic with
respect to the sub-string relation, the assumptions of Lemma 8.6 are satisfied (for
S := A∗). It is then easy to derive the L0-regularity of g.
Corollary 8.7. The length-first numbering g is L0-regular.
For any infinite subset Y of ω we define collY to be the unique order preserving
bijection from Y to ω.
Remark 8.8. Let X := g(L). Consider the numbering h := collX ◦ g of L. The
numbering h can be seen as a length-first enumeration of the well-formed expressions
in L (as opposed to considering arbitrary strings of A). Arguably, h is a reasonable
choice of a Gödel numbering.
Is h L0-regular? Lemma 8.6 cannot be applied to h, since its domain L is
not single-sorted and thus not closed under the constructor operations A˙ and M˙.
However, we can use this lemma to show that the length-first enumeration of the
closed-term fragment of L0 is L0-regular. Let L
◦ be given by
• t ::= 0 | St | Att | Mtt
Let X◦ := g(L◦). We take h◦ := collX◦ ◦ g to be the numbering of L
◦. Note L◦ is
closed under both A˙ and M˙. Hence, we can conclude from Lemma 8.6 that h◦ is
L0-regular. ❍
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8.2.2. Example of a Non-Regular Numbering. We define a non-regular numbering
of L0, given in Polish notation (see Section 2.1).
12 Let L⋆ denote the following
extension of L0:
• x ::= v | x′
• t ::= 0 | x | St | Att | Ad | Mtt | Md
• A ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | =tt | =d | ¬A | ∧AA | ∧D | ∨AA | ∨D | →AA | →D | ∀xA |
∃xA
• d ::= δt
• D ::= ∆A
The language L⋆ can be seen to implement the sharing of certain sub-expressions.
That is, L0-expressions of the form Btt, for any binary constructor symbol B, are
“contracted” to expressions of the form Bδt. This contraction and its reversal
is performed by the translation functions c : L0 → L
⋆ and t : L⋆ → L0, defined
recursively as follows: Both translations commute with all construction steps for t
and A involving the zero-ary operations, the unary operations and the quantifiers.
Moreover:
• c(Atu) :=
®
Aδc(t) if t = u;
Ac(t)c(u) if t 6= u;
similarly, for M;
• c(=tu) :=
®
=δc(t) if t = u;
=c(t)c(u) if t 6= u;
• c(∧AB) :=
®
∧∆c(A) if A = B;
∧c(A)c(B) if A 6= B;
similarly, for ∨ and →.
• t(Aδt) := At(t)t(t);
similarly, for M;
• t(=δt) := =t(t)t(t);
• t(∧∆A) := ∧t(A)t(A);
similarly for ∨ and →.
The translation t is well-defined. This follows from unique readability, which is
proved in the lemma below.
Lemma 8.9. L⋆ satisfies unique readability.
First Proof. Consider the language Lˆ that consists of the arithmetical language
extended with a new constant δ and a new (zero-ary) proposition symbol ∆. We
prove by an easy induction that every syntactical string of L⋆ is a syntactical string
of Lˆ. Now suppose an L⋆ syntactical object has two readings. We consider e.g.
the case where one of those readings is Mδt. Clearly, the other reading can only be
of the form Mδt since no L⋆-term can begin with δ. Now consider the case where
one reading is Mt1t2. The other reading must be of the form Mu1u2. We apply the
embedding into Lˆ and unique reading in Lˆ, to see that t1 = u1 and t2 = u2. ❑
Second Proof. Consider the language L˘ that consists of the arithmetical language
extended with new unary functions Aδ and Mδ, a new unary predicate symbol =δ
and new unary connectives ∧∆, ∨∆ and →∆. We map L
⋆ into L˘ by the obvious
mapping d that sends, e.g., At1t2 to Ad(t1)d(t2) and Aδt to Aδd(t). It is easy to
12We are indebted to the MathOverflow users Matt F., Fedor Pakhomov and Konrad Zdanowski
for their helpful suggestions which inspired our construction of the numbering gn3 (see (Zdanowski,
2020)).
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see that d is well-defined (since no L⋆-term can start with δ and no L⋆-formula can
start with ∆) and injective.
Now suppose an L⋆ syntactical object has two readings. We consider, e.g., the
case where one of those readings is Mδt. Clearly, the other reading can only be
of the form Mδt since no L⋆-term can begin with δ. Now consider the case where
one reading is Mt1t2. The other reading must be of the form Mu1u2. We apply
the embedding d into Lˆ and unique reading in Lˆ, to see that d(t1) = d(u1) and
d(t2) = d(u2). By the injectivity of d, we find t1 = u1 and t2 = u2. ❑
Let A be the alphabet of L⋆ with some fixed ordering. Let g be the length-first
numbering of A∗. We define our numbering gn3 of L0 by setting gn3(ϕ) := g(c(ϕ)).
Clearly, gn3 is injective, effective and (strongly) monotonic. We show that gn3 is
not regular.
Theorem 8.10. gn3 is not regular.
Proof. Since the size of A is 17, by Lemma 2.3 we have for each α ∈ A∗
17|α| − 1
16
≤ g(α) <
17|α|+1 − 1
16
.
Hence,
• gn3(n) = g(n) ≥
17n+1−1
16 ;
• gn3(Mnn) = g(Mδn) <
17n+4−1
16 .
But then, for all n > 4,
gn3(n) · gn3(n) ≥
Å
17n+1 − 1
16
ã2
≥
Å
17n
16
ã2
≥
172n−1
16
≥
17n+4 − 1
16
> gn3(Mnn). ❑
We note that the computation in the above proof does not depend on the specific
size of the alphabet, here represented by the numbers 17 and 16 = 17− 1. It works
as long as the alphabet has at least two symbols. So, certainly, it works for all
extensions for L0.
Remark 8.11. The present example of a non-regular Gödel numbering touches
lightly upon a theme that we do not discuss in this paper: Gödel numberings
based on alternative notions of syntax. Our treatment is mainly inspired by string
approaches and algebraic approaches. In our example we look at sharing in the
narrowest possible sense, but there are more principled and more encompassing
approaches to sharing involving directed acyclic graphs and the like.
Similarly, there are different approaches to variables like de Bruijn notations
and the Peirce-Quine linking notation. In Peirce diagrams and in the clause-set
notation, we abstract away from the order of finite conjunctions. Etcetera. ❍
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We think that gn3 is a perfectly reasonable Gödel numbering. We strengthen
this intuition by showing that gn3 has good properties.
Theorem 8.12. gn3 is monotonic. Moreover, it is strongly monotonic w.r.t. stan-
dard and efficient numerals.
Proof. We note that c preserves direct sub-expressions, in other words, if τ is a direct
sub-expression of ρ, then c(τ) is a direct sub-expression of c(ρ). It follows that c
preserves sub-expressions. Since g is monotonic, we may conclude that gn3 = g ◦ c
is also monotonic. Moreover, it is easy to see that c transforms standard numerals
and efficient numerals identically. Hence, gn3 inherits strong monotonicity both
with respect to standard numerals and to efficient numerals from g. ❑
Remark 8.13. We can easily adapt the numerals introduced in Section 6.2 to the
present situation in order to obtain numerals for which strong monotonicity fails
w.r.t. gn3. The numeral function on L0 would look as follows.
i. pd⋆(0) := 0 and pd⋆(1) := S0.
ii. Suppose n > 1, and n is not a power of a prime. Let p be the smallest prime
that divides n. Say n = pi · m, were p does not divide m and i > 0. Then
pd⋆(n) := ×pd⋆(pi)pd⋆(m).
iii. Suppose n = pi, where p is prime and i > 0. We take pd⋆(p) := p. In case
i = 2k, for k > 0, we set pd⋆(n) := ×pd⋆(pk)pd⋆(pk). In case i = 2k + 1, for
k > 0, we set pd⋆(n) := ×p×pd⋆(pk)pd⋆(pk).
It is easy to see that pd◦ := c ◦ pd⋆ behaves like pd from Example 6.2 with Mδ in
the role of Q. It follows that gn3(2
2n) grows exponentially in n. ❍
8.2.3. Smash and Exponentiation. Let# be a binary function symbol with Nelson’s
(1986) smash function, given by (m,n) 7→ 2|m|·|n|, as its intended interpretation.
Let exp be a unary function symbol for exponentiation. We set L# := L0 ∪ {#}
and Lexp := L0 ∪ {exp}. We now show that there are standard numberings found
in the literature which are neither L#-regular nor Lexp-regular.
Let ξ be a numbering such that there exists a polynomial P with
ξ(A) < 2P (|A|) for all A. (∗)
For instance, (Buss, 1986) and (Buss, 1998) contain numberings of L# with this
property. Moreover, length-first numberings, such as our numbering g, satisfy (∗).
To see this, let g be a length-first numbering over an alphabet with size N > 1.
Consider any m ∈ ω such that N ≤ 2m. By Lemma 2.3 we find, for all A:
g(A) <
N |A|+1 − 1
N − 1
< N |A|+1 ≤ (2m)|A|+1 = 2m·|A|+m.
We now show that any numbering ξ satisfying (∗) is neither L#-regular, nor
Lexp-regular.
Theorem 8.14. ξ is not L#-regular.
Proof. We define:
• 1̂ := (SS0# SS0)
• ’n+ 1 := (SS0# n̂).
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It is easy to check that ev(n̂) = 22
n+1
and |n̂| = 6n+ 3. Since P is a polynomial
there exists n ∈ ω such that P (6n+ 3) < 2n+1 and hence
ξ(n̂) < 2P (6n+3) < 22
n+1
= ev(n̂).
Thus by, Lemma 8.5, ξ is not L#-regular. ❑
Theorem 8.15. ξ is not Lexp-regular.
Proof. We define:
• Û0 := SS0
• n˘+ 1 := exp(Ûn).
We then have ev(Ûn) = 2 ⇈ (n+ 1) and |Ûn| = 3n+ 3.13 Since P is a polynomial
there exists n ∈ ω such that
ξ(Ûn) < 2P (3n+3) < 2 ⇈ (n+ 1) = ev(Ûn).
Thus, by Lemma 8.5, ξ is not Lexp-regular. ❑
9. Type-free Truth Theories
Building on work by Heck (2007), we now apply the results obtained in this
paper to the study of type-free axiomatic truth theories. More specifically, we show
that the consistency of certain type-free truth theories depends on the employed
formalisation choices. Consider for instance the following two important principles
of truth:14
NOT: The negation of a sentence A is true iff A is not true;
DISQ: A sentence of the form pt it trueq is true iff t denotes a true sentence.
Taken together, these principles can intuitively be shown to be inconsistent. In
order to show this, consider the Liar sentence
(L): L is not true.
Since L is the sentence “L is not true”, L is true iff “L is not true” is true. By
NOT, “L is not true” is true iff “L is true” is not true. By DISQ, “L is true” is not
true iff, L is not true. Hence, L is true iff L is not true. Contradiction (see (Heck,
2007, p.12)).
Following Heck we ask in which arithmetical framework this reasoning can be
captured. Let L be any primitive recursive extension of L0, i.e., the result of
adding function symbols for certain primitive recursive functions to L0. We set
LT := L ∪ {T}, where T is a new unary predicate symbol. The theory RL serves
as a (weak) syntax theory in the formalisation of informal truth principles. Let
moreover ν be a numeral function for L and let ξ be a numbering of LT. We now
consider the following arithmetical formalisations of (NOT) and (DISQ):
Not(ν, ξ): T(ν(ξ(¬A))) ↔ ¬T(ν(ξ(A)));
Disq(ν, ξ): T(t)↔ T(ν(ξ(T(t))));
Disq∗(ν, ξ): T(ν(ξ(A))) ↔ T(ν(ξ(T(ν(ξ(A))))));
13We use here Knuth’s up-arrow notation.
14For the philosophical significance of these principles see (Heck, 2004).
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whereA is any LT-sentence and t is any closed L-term. Roughly speaking, Disq(ν, ξ)
formalises (DISQ) by using all singular terms (of the given language) as names of
sentences, while the formalisation Disq∗(ν, ξ) only employs certain canonical names,
namely, ν-numerals. For every formalisation choice 〈L, ν, ξ〉 we consider the formal
truth theories
T (L, ν, ξ) := RL +Not(ν, ξ) +Disq(ν, ξ);
T ∗(L, ν, ξ) := RL +Not(ν, ξ) +Disq
∗(ν, ξ).
In general, different formalisation choices 〈L, ν, ξ〉 yield different theories T (L, ν, ξ)
and T ∗(L, ν, ξ) respectively.
We now address the question under which constraints on the underlying formal-
isation choices 〈L, ν, ξ〉 the LT-theories T (L, ν, ξ) and T
∗(L, ν, ξ) are inconsistent.
That is, under which conditions do these theories provide a faithful formalisation
of the intuitive reasoning regarding (NOT) and (DISQ)?
The reader is reminded that L+ is a language which results from adding function
symbols for primitive recursive functions to L0, such that L
+ contains a term which
represents the canonical strong diagonal function. Building on work by Heck, the
following answer can be extracted from the results of this paper.
Corollary 9.1. Let ν be given such that ν = · or ν = ·. Let γ be an E-adequate and
strongly monotonic numbering of L+ for efficient numerals, which is L0-regular. We
then have
1. T (L0, ·, gn2) ⊢ ⊥
2. T ∗(L+, ·, gn0) ⊢ ⊥
3. T (L0, ν, γ) 6⊢ ⊥
4. T ∗(L+, ν, γ) 6⊢ ⊥
Proof. Item (3) follows from (Heck, 2007, Theorem 1). For (4), see (Heck, 2007,
p.13).
We prove (2). By Lemma 4.6 there exists n ∈ ω such that (Eq) n = gn0(¬T(n)).
We can then derive in T ∗(L+, ·, gn0) the following contradiction
T(n) ↔ T(gn0(¬T(n))), using (Eq)
↔ ¬T(gn0(T(n))), using Not(·, gn0)
↔ ¬T(gn0(T(gn0(¬T(n))))), using (Eq)
↔ ¬T(gn0(¬T(n))), using Disq
∗(·, gn0)
↔ ¬T(n), using (Eq)
(1) can be shown similarly using Lemma 6.3. ❑
The results of the corollary can be summarised in the following table:
Constraints on numberings consistent inconsistent
E-adequate & strongly monotonic T (L0, ν, γ) T (L0, ·, gn2)
E-adequate & monotonic T ∗(L+, ν, γ) T ∗(L+, ·, gn0)
Thus, the conditions of E-adequacy and monotonicity taken together are not restric-
tive enough to determine the consistency T ∗(L+, ·, ξ). Moreover, the conditions of
E-adequacy and strong monotonicity for efficient numerals are together not restric-
tive enough to determine the consistency of T (L0, ν, ξ).
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10. Summary and Perspectives
In our paper we have studied various requirements on formalisation choices, such
as the Gödel numbering, under which m-self-reference is attainable in arithmetic.
In particular, we have examined the admissibility of self-referential numberings,
which provide immediate means to formalise m-self-reference. We have shown that
monotonicity and E-adequacy taken together do not exclude the self-referentiality
of a numbering. While the constraint of strong monotonicity excludes the self-
referentiality of numberings, we have shown that it does not block the attainability
of m-self-reference in the basic language L0. As a counterpoint, we have shown that
the demand that the numbering is regular does indeed render m-self-reference in L0
unattainable, but that, on the other hand, some completely decent numberings are
non-regular. The obtained results show that the attainability of m-self-reference in
L0 is more sensitive to the underlying formalisation choices than widely believed.
Finally, we have shown that this sensitivity also impinges on the formal study of
certain principles of self-referential truth. Namely, whether or not certain axiomatic
theories of self-referential truth are consistent is not determined by the constraints
of E-adequacy and (strong) monotonicity alone.
In the paper we formulated some open questions that we repeat here.
A. Are there Po-adequate numberings ξ for which ξ ◦ (·) is p-time?
B. Can we find Po-adequate self-referential Gödel numberings that are monotonic?
C. Can we find Po-adequate Gödel numberings which satisfy the Strong Diagonal
Lemma 6.3 that are strongly monotonic?
D. Is the numbering h (defined in Remark 8.8) L0-regular?
Our paper is a primarily technical contribution providing data for philosophy.
We have only gestured at philosophical motivations of the various constraints. We
do believe that the motivations given in the literature for various constraints are
extremely thin. However, we submit that this does not undermine the value of our
contribution too much, since our work will still provide a philosopher who sets out
to carefully argue for a constraint with an impression of what such a contraint does
or does not mean. Moreover, both the self-referential numberings themselves and
the study of various constraints on numberings have some technical interest entirely
independent of the philosophical motivation of various constraints.
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Appendix A. An Alternative Construction of a Monotonic
Self-Referential Numbering for Strings
We provide an alternative construction of a coding for strings which is self-
referential for efficient numerals and monotonic with respect to the sub-expression
relation. We believe that the inclusion of this construction is instructive, since in
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some sense it proceeds in a “bottom-up” and more direct fashion than the construc-
tions given in Section 4 & 5.
A.1. The Length-First Ordering and gn4. Let A be the alphabet of the arith-
metical language L0 introduced in Subsection 2.1 and let A
+ be A extended with
a fresh constant c and a fresh separator-symbol ;. We remind the reader of the fact
that A has 17 letters. Thus, A+ has 19 letters. We suppose some ordering of A+
is given. Let gn4 be the length-first ordering of strings of A
+. We write |α| for the
length of α as before.
We remind the reader that, by Lemma 2.3, we have
19|α| − 1
18
≤ gn4(α) <
19|α|+1 − 1
18
.
It follows that |α| ≤ gn4(α). Moreover, whenever |α| < |β|, then gn4(α) < gn4(β).
We define n˜ as before and remind the reader that ev(n˜) = 2n−1 and |n˜| = 7n+1
(see Lemma 3.6).
A.2. On gn5. We say that α is acceptable if it is of the form γ; δ, where γ and δ
are ;-free and where γ is a sub-string of δ. (Here we allow γ = δ.)
Suppose αn = γ; δ is acceptable. We take βn := γ[c := 2 gn4(δ;δ)]. In other words,
when δ; δ = αk, then βn := γ[c := Sk˜]. In all other cases we set βn to a don’t care
value, say ε, the empty string.
Lemma A.1. (βn)n∈ω enumerates the A-strings.
Proof. Clearly the βn neither contain ; nor c, so they are A-strings.
Conversely, suppose θ is an A-string. Let αk = θ; θ. Then, clearly, βk = θ. ❑
We note that the enumeration (βn)n∈ω has repetitions. We proceed with a technical
lemma.
Lemma A.2. Suppose γ; δ is adequate and gn4(δ; δ) = n. Then, |n˜| > |δ; δ| > |γ|,
and, hence, Sn˜ does not occur in γ.
Proof. We have:
|γ| < |δ; δ|
≤
19|δ;δ| − 1
18
≤ n
< 7n+ 1
= |n˜| ❑
Lemma A.3. Consider acceptable ζ := γ; δ and θ := µ; η. Let gn4(δ; δ) = n and
gn4(η; η) = m. Suppose that c occurs both in γ and in µ and ν := γ[c := Sn˜] =
µ[c := S‹m]. Then, ζ = θ.
Proof. We assume the conditions of the lemma. Note that n and m cannot be 0.
In case n = m, we see, by Lemmas 5.3 and A.2, that both γ and ǫ are the result of
replacing Sn˜ in ν by c. It follows that γ = µ. Trivially, δ = η. So, ζ = θ.
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Suppose m 6= n. This contradicts the fact that the largest term of the form Sk˜
in ν = γ[c := Sn˜] is Sn˜ and that the largest term of the form Sk˜ in ν = µ[c := S‹m]
is S‹m. ❑
Lemma A.4. Consider any A-string θ 6= ε. Let αm = θ; θ. We have βm = θ.
Suppose αn = γ; δ is acceptable and c occurs in γ and βn = θ. Then n < m.
Proof. The first claim is trivial. Suppose the conditions of the second claim. Let
αk = δ; δ. We have, by Lemma A.2, that |θ; θ| > |θ| ≥ |Sk˜| > |δ; δ| ≥ |γ; δ|. ❑
Consider any A-string ζ. Let us say that ζ is essential if, for some n, we have
ζ = βn and αn = γ; δ, where c occurs in γ. Otherwise, we call ζ inessential.
The combination of Lemmas A.3 and A.4 tells us that the enumeration of the βn
looks as follows. Suppose ζ is non-empty. If ζ is inessential it will be enumerated
first as βgn4(ζ;ζ). All occurrences of ζ in the enumeration will have the form βgn4(ζ;η),
where ζ is a sub-string of η. If ζ is essential, its first occurrence will be βgn4(γ,δ),
where γ, δ is adequate and c occurs in γ and ζ = γ[c := S(‚ gn4(δ; δ))]. After that
the enumeration mirrors the inessential case.
Remark A.5. We note that we could define a many-valued Gödel numbering
gn∗(ζ) := {n | ζ = βn}. There are no fundamental objections to many-valued
Gödel numberings as long as they are total, in the sense that to each string a non-
empty set of values is assigned, and injective, in the sense that the sets of values
assigned to two different strings are disjoint. However, since in our framework, we
opted for the more conventional choice of functional Gödel numberings, we will not
consider a Gödel numbering like gn∗. ❍
We define, for an A-string θ: gn5(θ) is the smallest n such that βn = θ.
We could compute gn5 as follows. Let an A-string ζ be given.
Is ζ the empty string? If yes, gn5(ζ) := 0. If no, does ζ have
a sub-string of the form Sk˜? If no, set gn5(ζ) := gn4(ζ; ζ). If
yes, find the largest such k, say it is n. Let γ be the result of
replacing all occurrences of Sn˜ in ζ by c. Is αn of the form δ; δ,
where γ; δ is adequate? If no, set gn5(ζ) := gn4(ζ; ζ). If yes, put
gn5(ζ) := gn4(γ; δ).
The Gödel numbering gn5 is not monotonic with respect to the sub-string ordering
and ≤. Suppose, e.g., n = gn4(δ; δ). Clearly, n˜ is inessential, since it does not
contain any sub-string of the form Sk˜. We remind the reader that |n˜| = 7n+1. So,
we have:
gn5(n˜) = gn4(n˜; n˜) ≥
1914n+3 − 1
18
> n,
gn5(Sn˜) = gn4(c; δ) < gn4(δ; δ) = n.
So, gn5(Sn˜) < gn5(n˜).
We will prove two lemmas about classes of cases where gn5 is monotonic.
Lemma A.6. Suppose ζ is inessential and θ is a sub-string of ζ. Then, gn5(θ) ≤
gn5(ζ).
Proof. Suppose ζ is inessential. Then, gn5(θ) ≤ gn4(θ; θ) ≤ gn4(ζ; ζ) = gn5(ζ). ❑
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Let W be the set of well-formed expressions of the arithmetical language. We
partition W in two classes W0 and W1. Here:
• W0 := {SS0} ∪ {n˜ | n ∈ ω} ∪ {(SS0× n˜) | n ∈ ω}
• W1 := W \W0
Lemma A.7. Suppose θ ∈ W1 and ζ ∈ W . Suppose further that θ is a sub-
expression of ζ. Then, gn5(θ) ≤ gn5(ζ).
Proof. Suppose gn5(ζ) = gn4(γ; δ). Let n := gn4(δ; δ) and let θ0 be the result of
replacing all occurrences of Sn˜ in θ by c. (We include the case here where there are
no such occurrences.)
We claim that θ0 is a sub-expression of γ. To see this consider the parse-tree of
ζ. Since θ is in W1, it cannot occur strictly below a node labeled Sn˜. So, relabeling
the nodes labeled Sn˜ with c and removing all nodes below them in the parse-tree of
ζ will result in occurrences of θ0 at the places where we originally had occurrences
of θ.
It follows that gn5(θ) ≤ gn4(θ0; δ) ≤ gn4(γ; δ) = gn5(ζ). ❑
A.3. On gn6. Finally, we are ready and set to define the desired Gödel number-
ing gn6.
• gn6(SS0) = 2
• gn6(n˜) := 4n+ 1
• gn6((SS0× n˜)) := 4n+ 3
• gn6(α) := 2
gn5(α), if α is in W1.
We have:
Lemma A.8. gn6 is injective on W .
Proof. Suppose α is well-formed. The only case where we could go wrong is where
gn5(α) is 0 or 1. Since α is well-formed, it is not the empty string. So, for some
adequate γ; δ, where γ is well-formed, we have gn5(α) = gn4(γ; δ). We note that
|γ; δ| ≥ 3, so gn5(α) = gn4(γ; δ) ≥
193−1
18 > 1. ❑
So gn6 is indeed a Gödel numbering.
Lemma A.9. Suppose α is in W0. Then, gn6(α) ≤ |α| ≤ gn4(α) ≤ gn5(α).
Proof. Suppose α is in W0. We note that, for no k, we have Sk˜ is a sub-string of
α. So, gn5(α) = gn4(α;α). It follows that |α| ≤ gn4(α) ≤ gn4(α;α) = gn5(α).
Moreover, we have:
gn6(SS0) = 2 < |SS0|
gn6(n˜) = 4n+ 1 ≤ 7n+ 1 = |n˜|
gn6((SS0× n˜)) = 4n+ 3 < 7n+ 6 = |(SS0× n˜)| ❑
Lemma A.10. Suppose Sn˜ is essential. Then, gn6(n˜) < gn6(Sn˜)
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Proof. Suppose Sn˜ is essential. Since Sn˜ cannot have a proper sub-term of the
form S‹m, we find that gn5(Sn˜) = gn4(c; δ) for some δ that contains c. Moreover,
n = gn4(δ; δ). We have:
gn6(n˜) = 4n+ 1
< 4
192|δ|+2 − 1
18
+ 1
< 2
19|δ|+2−1
18
≤ 2n ❑
Lemma A.11. gn6 restricted to W is monotonic w.r.t. the sub-expression ordering
and <.
Proof. Suppose θ is a sub-expression of ζ.
Case 1: Suppose θ ∈ W1. Then, we are immediately done by Lemma A.7.
Case 2: Suppose θ ∈ W0.
Case 2.1: Suppose ζ ∈ W0. Then, we are done, by inspection of the definition
of gn6 on W0.
Case 2.2: Suppose ζ ∈ W1.
Case 2.2.1: Suppose ζ is inessential. Then, by Lemma A.9, gn6(θ) ≤ gn5(θ) and,
by Lemma A.6, gn5(θ) ≤ gn5(ζ). Hence,
gn6(θ) ≤ gn5(θ) ≤ gn5(ζ) < 2
gn5(ζ) = gn6(ζ).
Case 2.2.2: Suppose ζ is essential. It follows that gn5(ζ) = gn4(γ; δ), where c
occurs in γ. Let n := gn4(δ; δ). By Lemma A.2, we see that |n˜| > |γ|. It follows
that any sub-term of γ that is in W0 must be a sub-term of n˜. Hence, any sub-
term of ζ that is in W0 must be in n˜. So, by Case 2.1, gn6(θ) ≤ gn6(n˜). Also,
clearly, Sn˜ is essential, so, by Lemma A.10, gn6(n˜) < gn6(Sn˜). Finally, by Case 1:
gn6(Sn˜) ≤ gn6(ζ). So, gn6(θ) ≤ gn6(ζ). ❑
We end with the obvious insight that gn6 is self-referential.
Lemma A.12. Consider any arithmetical formula A(x) in which there is a free
occurrence of x. Let n = gn4(A(c);A(c)) and let k = 2
n. Then, k = gn6(A(k)).
We may conclude:
Theorem A.13. The function gn6 is a monotonic Gödel numbering that is self-
referential for dyadic numerals.
We note that our Gödel numbering is elementary and the tracking functions for the
connectives also will be elementary.
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